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BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC
POLICY AND FREE TRADE
Diane A. Desierto*
I think we need to start a discussion about the future — a future
which honors the aims of the Marrakesh Agreement, which is
worthy of our role in international relations, trade and development, and which delivers for the people we are here to serve —
particularly the poorest. It is time to face up to the undeniable
problems we have in this organization and have an open and
honest discussion about how we can move forward.
WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo1

INTRODUCTION: AN ‘EITHER-OR’ DILEMMA AT THE WTO?
In the wake of the impasse between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and India regarding the ratification of the
Protocol to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) that concluded during the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali,
Indonesia on December of 2013, WTO Director-General Roberto
Azevedo admitted that while the WTO succeeds in resolving
trade disputes and monitoring trade practices, it “has failed to


Paper prepared for Korea Society of International Economic Law
(KSIEL) International Conference on “Trade and Global Governance: A Panoramic View of Free Trade Agreements and the WTO,” November 6-7, 2014,
Novotel Ambassador Gangnam, Seoul, Korea (This paper draws from insights
in this author’s forthcoming book, DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND
INVESTMENT (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter “DESIERTO 2015”]).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawaii William S. Richardson
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LLB/now JD (2004) cum laude salutatorian, BSc Economics (2000) summa
cum laude valedictorian. I may be reached at dsierto@hawaii.edu,
desiertd@EastWestCenter.org, dianedesierto@aya.yale.edu.
1
WTO Director-General’s Statement at the Trade Negotiations Committee
Formal
Meeting,
Oct.
16,
2014,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/tnc_stat_16oct14_e.htm.

549

1

3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE)

550

PACE INT’L L. REV.

7/14/2015 4:41 PM

[Vol. XXVII::2

deliver new multilateral results since its creation.”2 This systemic failure in the trade negotiations pillar of the WTO is evident to all of its 160 Members. It is evident from thirteen years
of stalled negotiations under the Doha Round;3 the inability of
the WTO to encourage agreements between developing and developed countries on the Doha Development Agenda;4 the contemporaneous proliferation of around 585 regional trade
agreements (RTAs)5 which, at best, have not facilitated any apparent global agreement under the Doha Round;6 and (more recently) India’s demand for permanent changes to WTO rules to
avoid sanctioning developing countries’ food security policies.7
While many WTO Members have publicly criticized India for
unfairly holding the TFA hostage,8 other powerful Green Room9
2

Speech by WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo, Canada, Oct. 9,
2014, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra36_e.htm.
3
See Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573, 577-82 (2010).
4
Id.
5
As of June 15, 2014, the 585 notifications of RTAs (separately counting
goods, services and accessions), with 379 in force, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last accessed
Mar. 10, 2015).
6
See Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO: A Proposal for the Reform of Article XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat, 26
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 2 (2005), 267-319; Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen,
and Christian Volpe Martincus, Regional Trade Agreements: Development
Challenges and Policy Options, Inter-American Development Bank, 1, 17-18?
(Nov. 2012), available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/11955
.pdf.
7
See J.P. Singh, India’s multi-faceted WTO refusal, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
2014,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/08/05/indias-multi-faceted-wto-refusal/; Jayati Ghosh, India
faces criticism for blocking global trade deal but is it justified, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 22, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
poverty-matters/2014/aug/22/india-criticism-blocking-global-trade-deal.
8
See Raymond Zhong and Peter Kenny, WTO Fails to Ratify Trade
Agreement,
Wall
St.
J.,
July
31,
2014,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pressures-india-on-wto-trade-agreement1406820288 (On criticisms against India’s position from emerging markets/developing country members as well as developed country members); See
India’s blocking of WTO deal triggers harsh criticism,” Aug. 1, 2014,
http://www.dw.de/indias-blocking-of-wto-deal-triggers-harsh-criticism/a17825484; Armellini and Helen Maguire, Europe-Asia summit set to criticize
India over WTO blockage, DPA INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 17, 2014,
http://www.dpa-international.com/news/asia/europe-asia-summit-set-tocriticize -india-over-wto-blockage-a-39923664.html; See Kerry challenges
Modi over WTO stance, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AND TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 2,
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members at the WTO have maintained silence over India’s concerns on food security other than to affirm the devastating consequences of failing to ratify the TFA.10 These members maintain this silence even in light of economic and policy grounds
that may well publicly demonstrate the critical importance to
India that its continued participation in global trade under
multilateral trading rules would have in ensuring cheaper access to food for India’s population and, ultimately, higher wages for India’s poorest.11
India’s choice to block ratification of the Protocol to the
TFA was more a matter of how the WTO Membership could
reach permanent decisions on food security with the same expeditiousness as the TFA; –the WTO was indifferent to food security within the multilateral trade negotiation agenda. While
the entire WTO membership was still negotiating a permanent
solution on the critical issue of food security, the WTO Ministerial Conference at Bali issued a Ministerial Decision that would
have insulated India from suit under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism for any of its public stockholdings for food security purposes.12 In response, India reiterated its position
that resolving food security issues had to be prioritized with
2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/
2014/08/02/2003596499.
9
See generally, Kent Jones, Green room politics and the WTO’s crisis of
representation, 9 PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 3 (Oct. 2009), 349-57
(On the heavy impact of unrepresentative Green Room members on WTO decision-making).
10
Canada Statement on WTO Failure to Adopt Protocol for Trade Facilitation
Agreement,
Aug.
1,
2014,
available
at
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-communiques/2014/08/01a.
aspx?lang=eng; Statement by US Ambassador Michael Froman on the World
Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement Protocol Failure, July
2014, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2014/July/Statement-by-Amb-Froman-on-WTO-Trade-FacilitationAgreement-Protocol-Failure (last accessed Mar. 10, 2015); Statement by EU
Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht on Trade Facilitation Agreement, Aug.
4, 2014, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1144.
11
See e.g., Joshua Meltzer, Improving Indian Food Security: Why Prime
Minister Modi Should Embrace the WTO, Brookings, May. 16, 2014, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/05/16-world-tradeorganization-india-food-security-meltzer.
12
WTO Ministerial Decision of Dec. 7, 2013, Public stockholding for food
security
purposes,
WT/MIN
(13)/38,
WT/L/913,
available
at
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci38_e.htm.
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same emphasis as trade facilitation under the Bali ministerial
decisions, stressing that
overall balance is important even in a limited package of outcomes. The Bali outcomes were negotiated as a package and
must be concluded as such . . . developing countries such as India
must have the freedom to use food reserves to feed their poor
without the threat of sanctions. 13

This call for rebalancing of priorities in multilateral trade
negotiations, to specifically address food security, fully aligns
with the conclusions and recommendations of Olivier De Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food:
“Food security is presently treated under the WTO as the
grounds for exceptions for a very limited range of trade liberalization commitments. A more appropriate reframing of agricultural trade rules would explicitly recognize that marketdetermined outcomes do not necessarily improve food security
and that the purpose of agricultural trade rules should be to facilitate food security-enhancing policies, even though this may require limiting the pace of trade liberalization in some sectors
and/or granting States additional policy flexibility in pursuit of
international recognized food security objectives. WTO Members
should preserve and create a range of flexibilities in the Doha
Round negotiations in order to ensure that the future international trade regime operates in lock step with multilateral and
national efforts to address food insecurity. In particular, they
should:
1. Make WTO measures more compatible with the pursuit of
food security and the human right to food. Negotiators should
ensure that, for example, the future criteria of the green box does
not impede the development of policies and programs to support
food security and the realization of the right to food; and that
they are tailored to the specific national circumstances of developing countries. The proposed amendment in the draft agricultural modalities to Annex 2 in the [Agreement on Agriculture] is
of vital importance for many developing countries and should be
agreed to immediately and without expectation of trade concessions.
13

Permanent solution on food security in WTO rules is a must, says Amit
Narang LIVEMINT, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/xzW8fnSJ2
5UDdOsqZq5ddL/Permanent-solution-on-food-security-in-WTO-rules-ismustm-s.html (last accessed Mar. 10, 2015).
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2. Exclude defining the establishment and management of food
reserves as trade-distorting support, when these schemes serve
the needs of food-insecure vulnerable groups. States should also
adapt the provisions of the [Agreement on Agriculture] and other
WTO agreements (e.g. public procurement) to ensure compatibility with the establishment of food reserves at national, regional
and international level; and they should bring clarity to the overlap of responsibilities and commitments which could impact the
efforts of countries that engage in efforts to establish food reserves at regional level.
3. Ensure that marketing boards and supply management
schemes are not prohibited in the future framework for agricultural policy nor precluded under loan conditionality and other
policy reforms by the international financial institutions. Options
available under the WTO framework to establish such policies
should be further explored.
4. Guarantee the possibility for developing States to insulate
domestic markets from the volatility of prices on international
markets. States, particularly developing States in accordance
with the principle of special and differential treatment, must retain the freedom to take such measures. The negotiations should
i) strengthen and materialize the proposed safeguard measures –
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and Special Products (SPs);
and ii) ensure that States maintain flexibilities to regulate the
volume of imports in order for policies such as marketing boards
and supply management schemes to be fully functional, as
measures such as the SSM can only be implemented on a temporary basis. In particular, the conditions should be put in place so
that it is in the interests of developing countries to adopt tariffrate quotas on key tariff lines, and thus manage import volumes
and price volatility more durably. States should also carefully
examine the impacts of additional cuts to tariffs on national food
security. States should refuse such cuts if they are unable to
counterbalance negative impacts on food-insecure vulnerable
groups with national policies, including social safety-nets and the
creation of non-agricultural employment opportunities. States
should consider reducing tariffs on key inputs for agricultural
production taking into account the need to promote increased
food production in a sustainable and socially-inclusive manner.
5. Take steps to limit States’ excessive reliance on international trade in the pursuit of food security. In building their capacity
to produce the food needed to meet consumption needs, States
should support in particular poor small-scale farmers and the

5
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production of staple foods.
6. In the case of a failed Doha Round, propose medium and
long-term changes to the existing WTO framework to ensure profood security programs are not categorized as trade-distorting
support. This should include, for example, changes to the green
box criteria and rules on safeguards. Such changes should be
fast-tracked and aimed at facilitating access to these measures
without requiring additional concessions from food insecure developing countries.”14

India’s ongoing deadlock with the WTO over food security
and the ratification of the Protocol to the TFA may well signal
the ‘death’ knell and crisis, which for many, reverberates
throughout the WTO and the Doha Development Agenda.15 The
deadlock signals a governance crisis for the WTO in addressing
the competing public policy claims of WTO Members. It is
symptomatic of an erroneously hardening ‘either-or’ approach
used when asserting and engaging public policy at the WTO.
Public policy could very well encompass both the State’s
trade concerns, as well as other significant public interests entrusted to the State, such as environmental safety, social protection, and cultural preservation.16 This is clear from the na14

Olivier De Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food Crisis
Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System,
Briefing
Note
No.
4,
1,16-17
(Nov.
2011),
available
at
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20111116_briefing_
note_05_en.pdf.
15
See Rorden Wilkinson, Of Butchery and Bicycles: The WTO and the
‘Death’ of the Doha Development Agenda, 83 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 2,
395-401 (April-June 2012); David Kleimann and Joe Guinan, The Doha
Round: An Obituary, Global Governance Programme Policy Brief, Issue
2011/June
2011,
available
at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/TheDohaR
ound_AnObituary_June2011.pdf; Surendra Bhandari, Doha Round Negotiations: Problems, Potential Outcomes, and Possible Implications, 4 TRADE LAW
& DEVELOPMENT 2, 353-84 (2012); Susan C. Schwab, After Doha: Why Negotiations are Doomed and What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 90,
104-117 (2011); Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy
Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 1, 7-22 (2002); SONIA E. ROLLAND,
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 243-63 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
16
See Tristan Le Cotty and Tancrede Voituriez, The Potential Role for
Collective Preferences in Determining the Rules of the International Trading
System, 165, 178 in PAUL EKINS AND TANCREDE VOITURIEZ (EDS.), TRADE,
GLOBALIZATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL LOOK AT
METHODS AND OUTCOMES 1 (Earthscan 2009).
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ture of public policy as a highly subjective, value-driven17 matter of governance undertaken by different authoritative decision-makers, at various levels, national and international. By
definition, public policy is vague as to any a priori content of
policy,18 other than as to matters of source (e.g. ensuring that
the policy arises from public decision-makers or public agencies) and objective (e.g. aiming to address societal problems of a
given population).19 Drawing from the original pioneering work
of Harold Lasswell,20 policy process research looks to the analysis of context in the policy cycle or the “key stages of policymaking: the ways in which people struggle to define issues as problems worthy of attention on government agendas; how people
analyze problems and devise and select among policy alterna17

See Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J.2,
203, 207 (Mar. 1943) (“None who deal with law, however, can escape policy
when policy is defined as the making of important decisions which affect the
distribution of values.”).
18
Robert E. Goodin, Martin Rein, and Michael Moran, The Public and its
Policies, pp. 3-38 in MICHAEL MORAN, MARTIN REIN, AND ROBERT E. GOODIN
(EDS.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006).
19
MICHAEL HILL AND PETER HUPE, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY:
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 1, 5 (SAGE Publications 2002)
(“What is, in general, striking about the definitions of public policy indicated
here is the purposive character public policies are expected to have, and the
way in which they are expected to be related to (societal) problems.”); See
generally CHARLES L. COCHRAN AND ELOISE F. MALONE, PUBLIC POLICY:
PERSPECTIVES AND CHOICES 1, 3 (5th edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014)
(“Public policy can be described as the overall framework within which government actions are undertaken to achieve public goals, with a good working
definition of public policy, for our purposes, being the study of government
decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern. Policies are purposive courses of action devised in response to a perceived problem. Public policies are filtered through a specific policy process, adopted,
implemented through laws, regulatory measures, courses of government action, and funding priorities, and enforced by a public agency. Individuals and
groups attempt to shape public policy through the mobilization of interest
groups, advocacy education, and political lobbying. Official policy provides
guidance to governments over a range of actions and also provides mutual
accountability links between the government and its citizens. The policy process includes several key aspects: a definition of the problem to be addressed,
the goals the policy is designed to achieve, and the instruments of policy that
are employed to address the problem and achieve the policy goals. Public policy is the heart, soul, and identity of governments everywhere.”).
20
Harold D. Lasswell, The policy orientation in DANIEL LERNER AND
HAROLD D. LASSWELL (EDS.), THE POLICY SCIENCES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SCOPE AND METHOD, 1, 3-15 (STAN. Univ.Press, 1959).
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tives; how people implement policy; and how people evaluate
and sometimes terminate policy.”21
With these conceptual clarifications, one can reasonably
accept that compliance with the rules of multilateral trade is
itself also a matter of public policy.22 When the WTO speaks of
balancing “national public policy” and “free trade”, it is in reality speaking of competing priorities of public policy decisionmaking, (which takes place at the national level of a State that
is a WTO Member) and collective multilateral level decisionmaking under the WTO’s political organs and dispute settlement functions. The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration promised that the WTO membership would collectively undertake
the task of balancing public policies and integrate trade with
sustainable development:
“2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of
economic development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are developing
countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart
of the Work Program adopted in this Declaration. Recalling the
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a
share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market
access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed
technical assistance and capacity-building programs have important roles to play . . . .
6. We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding
21

Peter de Leon and Christopher M. Weible, Policy Process Research for
Democracy: A Commentary on Lasswell’s Vision, 1 International Journal of
Policy Studies 2, 23, 23-34 (2010).
22
See Tonia Novitz, International law and human rights in the context of
globalization in PATRICIA KENNETT (ED.), GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, AND
PUBLIC POLICY, 107, 120 (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2008); See World Trade
Report 2012, Part II, Trade and public policies: A closer look at non-tariff
measures
in
the
21st
century,
36-46,
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr12-2a_e.pdf (last accessed Mar. 10, 2015).
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and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral
trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment
and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be
mutually supportive. We take note of the efforts by members to
conduct national environmental assessments of trade policies on
a voluntary basis. We recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection
of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at
the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement
that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the
provisions of the WTO Agreements. We welcome the WTO’s continued cooperation with UNEP and other intergovernmental environmental organizations. We encourage efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO and relevant international
environmental and developmental organizations.
8. We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding internationally recognized core labour
standards. We take note of work under way in the International
Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization.
10. Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency and the effective participation of all members.
While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are committed to making the WTO’s operations more
transparent, including through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels
continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO
and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multilateral trading system.”23

Thus, it is clear that the multilateral trade agenda, since
the start of the Doha Round in 2001, was precisely intended to
integrate national and international public policy discourses.
The international community cannot frame public policy under
a simplistic ‘either-or’ dilemma, where States must choose be23

WTO
Ministerial
Declaration,
Doha,
Nov.
14,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
accessed Mar. 10, 2015). Italics added.

2001,
(last

9
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tween trade interests and non-trade objectives. Rather, the
fundamental paradigmatic shift acknowledged in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration (if not implemented in practice to date
in stalled trade negotiations) is to reexamine the functional decisions and interactions of the WTO and its Members. It is also
ensuring that the overall global wealth created from increasing
trade liberalization and expanding foreign market access under
the WTO system is not being generated through multiple social
externalities, such as: means and processes of production that
incur severe and unjustifiable environmental damages; permitting oppressive labor conditions, tolerating food insecurity and
the debilitating dislocations bred by poverty; accepting the demise of cultural traditions and theft of indigenous knowledge;
and rigidly incapacitating the abilities of WTO Member States
to govern in ways that render them unable to respond rapidly
to economic crises and emergencies in their jurisdictions, nor
appropriately address fluctuating public policy needs of their
citizens.24
The Doha Ministerial Declaration expressly hearkens back
to the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, which mandates the WTO and its
Members with the duty of:
recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising the standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect the and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.25

Balancing national public policy and free trade is thus a
24

See WTO Secretariat, Harnessing trade for sustainable development
and
a
green
economy,
2011,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/brochure_rio_20_e.pdf (last
accessed Mar. 10, 2015).
25
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr.
15,
1994,
1867
U.N.T.S
154,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (last accessed Oct. 1,
2014) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
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matter for cyclical coordination26 by WTO Members. This is
primarily to ensure trade and non-trade policy compliance, particularly since the survival of the world trade system also depends on prohibiting unjustified trade distortions and dismantling pretextual State protectionism.
Such protectionism
prevents consumers and producers from benefiting from the
most efficient prices and production of goods and services all
over the world.27 The task of balancing national public policy
and free trade requires, at its core, an understanding of the
ways in which the world trade system responds to felt resource,
environmental, and social inequalities that unjustifiably undergird trade.28
Balancing free trade commitments with other national
public policies is ultimately a search for sustainable policy flexibility – one that enables WTO Members’ transparent calibration of all public policy interests (trade, environment, economic
social and cultural rights, among others) in a manner that is
both accountable to its citizens and responsible to all other participants in world trade. In order to achieve sustainable policy
26

See YVES BONZON, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY IN THE WTO
1, 136 (Cambridge Univer. Press, 2014) (“…policy coordination would have
the benefit of regulating the interface between domestic regulations and
WTO principles so as to ‘insulate from the scrutiny of negative integration
domestic regulation that is assumed either non-protectionist or efficient, because it conforms to international regulation.’ When faced with sensitive
questions, it can be observed that the dispute settlement organs have referred on occasions to instruments of policy coordination originating outside
the WTO, a practice that some have referred to as ‘judicial activism.’ The
dispute settlement organs have thus shown a preference for trade measures
that are directly aimed at the protection of multilaterally approved goals or
interests”).
27
See SALLIE JAMES & K. WILLIAM WATSON, Regulatory Protectionism: A
Hidden Threat to Free Trade, Cato Inst. Policy Analysis,723 POLICY ANALYSIS
1
(Apr.
9,
2013),
available
at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa723.pdf (last accessed Mar.
11, 2015); ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATORY MEASURES, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 458 (Martin Daunton, Amrita Narlikar &
Robert M. Stern eds., 2012).
28
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3-10 (2002);
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, part III, (Harvard
Univ. Press, 2014); Ajit K. Ghose, Global Economic Inequality and International Trade, International Labour Organization, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
229-52
(2001),
available
at
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/2/229.full.pdf+html (last accessed
Mar. 12, 2015).
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flexibility, this Article contends that public policy interests
within the WTO system require better functional and institutional coordination on all three functional pillars of the WTO –
trade negotiations, dispute settlement, and trade monitoring.
This Article also takes the position that such public policy interests also require the empirical integration of WTO Members’
preexisting international commitments on environmental duties and on economic, social, and cultural rights to better inform the public policy coordination process. This approach to
balancing economic and social objectives through an emerging
principle of coordination is modeled after the method adopted
by the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case.29 In interpreting a
treaty-based regime in regard to the joint demands of economic
development and environmental protection when using a
shared resource, the Court emphasized the importance of continuous cooperation and coordination between States to accomplish both objectives:
“76. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the Court, after recalling
that ‘[t]his need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development’, and added that ‘[i]t is for the Parties
themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account of the
objectives of the Treaty’…
77. The Court observes that it is by cooperating that the States
concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the environment that might be created by the plans initiated by one or
other of them, so as to prevent the damage in question, through
the performance of both the procedural and the substantive obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute. However, whereas the
substantive obligations are frequently worded in broad terms, the
procedural obligations are narrower and more specific, so as to
facilitate the implementation of the 1975 Statute through a process of continuous consultation between the parties concerned…
177. Regarding Article 27 [of the 1975 Statute], it is the view of
the Court that its formulation reflects not only the need to reconcile the varied interests of riparian States in a transboundary
context and in particular in the use of a shared natural resource,
29

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 14, paras. 75, 181-89 (Apr. 20).
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but also the need to strike a balance between the use of the waters
and the protection of the river consistent with the objective sustainable development…Article 27 embodies this interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared resource and the balance between economic development and
environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable development.”30

To date, the WTO lacks a functional system for coordinating the protection of trade and non-trade public policies of
WTO members. Part II (Segmented Efforts at Balancing
National Public Policy and Free Trade through the DSU,
TPRM, and Trade Negotiations) discusses how public policy
provisions in the WTO covered Agreements are unequally implemented and variably engaged within the three functional
pillars of the WTO. These functional pillars are, namely, as follows: dispute settlement, as facilitated by the WTO dispute settlement organs (the Appellate Body and dispute settlement
Panels) pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU);31 trade monitoring conducted through the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM) administered by the WTO General
Council acting in the capacity of the Trade Policy Review Board
(TPRB);32 and trade negotiations under the WTO Ministerial
Conference, the supreme decision-making body of the WTO.33
Although there are numerous provisions in the WTO agreements that enable WTO Members to calibrate their compliance
with trade commitments and other significant public policy

30

Id. at paras. 76-77, 177. Italics added.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (last accessed Mar.
12, 2015) [hereinafter DSU].
32
Trade Policy Review Mechanism art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement,
Annex
3,
1869
U.N.T.S.
401,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm_e.htm (last accessed Mar.
12 2015); See Fact Sheet from Steffen Grammling, FES Geneva, WTO’s
Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Explanations and Reflections, Dialogue on
Globalization No. 3 (Apr. 2009); Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal
to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, 9-36 (2013).
33
Marrakesh Agreement, art. IV:1-4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154.
31
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priorities,34 there is no formal mechanism or mandate that requires deliberate cross-referencing between the WTO political
organs and dispute settlement organs in discharging their
functions in that calibration process. One, therefore, finds more
development on the interpretation of public policy exceptions
(as in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV) in the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and Panels, in contrast to the
scant consideration afforded for a WTO Member’s public policy
programming and priorities within the TPRM process, or the
awkward compartmentalization of “trade issues” and “nontrade” issues in the trade negotiations process manifested in
the deadlocks in Doha and Bali.
Part III (The Public Policy Institutional Deficits in
the WTO System: Who Undertakes ‘Balancing’?) discusses the unequal participation and leveraged access to information between and among WTO Members (Green Room
members vis-à-vis other coalitions), as well as those involving
States as WTO Members vis-à-vis other non-State public policy
stakeholders, such as public interest groups, civil society or
nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, and
UN specialized agencies.35 While each WTO Member has an
34

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade
in Services art. XIV, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement art.
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; Special and differential treatment
provisions, WT/COMTD/W/196, June 14, 2013 [hereinafter S&D]; Balance of
Payments Measures, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XII Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1, 55 U.N.T.S 194; see GATT Article XII, GATT 1994 Article XVIII:B, & GATS Article XII:1. For discussion of public policy provisions
in the WTO covered agreements, see ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW,
POLITICS, AND LEGITIMACY 82 (Cameron May, 2007); DESIERTO 2015, at Chapter 3.
35
JOHN H. BARTON, JUDITH L. GOLDSTEIN, TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, & RICHARD
H. STEINBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND
ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 61 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2006) (on
the politics of the GATT/WTO legal system); Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza and
Marie Wilke, Revisiting the Single Undertaking: Towards More Balanced Approach to WTO Negotiations 486 in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE
WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES NEED PINCITE (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011).
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equal vote in trade negotiations in theory, participation varies
in practice. Specifically, participation varies according to international economic and political influence, the capacity to effectively use the political processes of the WTO, and the basic
ability to detect foreign market access violations and marshal
the resources necessary to avail of the dispute settlement system.36 If systemic reforms to participation and transparency
(rather than incremental reforms) are not fully designed across
all three functional pillars of the WTO, then it will continue to
be difficult to foster durable decisions on calibrating national
public policy and free trade; furthermore, WTO Members, private sector trade associations, and non-State public policy
stakeholders at large will generally not accept these reforms,
nor perceive them as legitimate.
In the Conclusion (Actualizing the ‘Principles of Coordination and Cooperation’ – The WTO as the Forum
for International Public Policy), this Article emphasizes
that normatively reorienting international trade policy within
the spectrum of numerous public policies of WTO Members to
include environmental duties and economic social and cultural
rights, while also realigning governance functions and participation rights at the WTO, would help save the WTO from growing perceptions of diminished relevance and institutional illegitimacy.37
Sustainable policy flexibility, as originally
36

KATI KULOVESI, THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: CHALLENGES
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, LEGITIMACY AND FRAGMENTATION 26-27 (2011) (“The 153

Members of the WTO are remarkably unequal in terms of size, population as
well economic and political weight. According to Zampetti, such inequality
‘translates into an asymmetry in the ability to participate in decision-making
processes, as such democratically suspect if not illegitimate which has the potential to perpetuate if not reinforce an uneven distribution of benefits and
burdens in the world economy.’ In addition, many smaller developing countries also lack the capacity and human resources to participate efficiently in
the WTO processes. The Geneva missions of the most influential WTO Members, such as Canada, the European Community, Japan, and the US have
several professionals dealing exclusively with WTO issues. In contrast, developing country diplomats tend to represent their countries also in numerous other international agencies and not all developing country Members
even have permanent missions in Geneva. This makes it difficult for such
countries to participate effectively in the functioning of the WTO or to keep
their national constituencies adequately informed”).
37
See Henry Gao & C.L. Lim, Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA
Disputes, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 4, 899-925 (2008).
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envisaged in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, materializes only when the WTO recognizes
that its functional pillars must approach public policy balancing through a textured understanding of a ‘law of coordination’38 based on the law-making agreements of States.
II. SEGMENTED EFFORTS AT BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC
POLICY AND FREE TRADE THROUGH THE DSU, TPRM, AND
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Public policy issues in the trade context have been differentially approached and valued within the WTO’s three functional pillars. There has been more development in the interpretive practices of the WTO dispute settlement organs in
regard to treaty provisions as they relate to public policy exceptions in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV, in contrast to
the trade policy review process or the multilateral trade negotiations process.
A. ‘Public Policy’ Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body
and Panels
Article 3(2) of the WTO DSU expressly provides that dispute settlement at the WTO
is a central element in providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings
of the [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.39

Dispute settlement must thus stay within this fundamental remit of conducting ‘clarification’ of existing provisions of
WTO agreements in order to ‘preserve’ the rights and obligations of WTO Members as detailed in the WTO agreements.
In practice, the WTO Appellate Body and Panels demon38

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INT’L CMTY 415-16
(5th ed., 2008).
39
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, supra note 34, at art. 3(2).
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strate a broad understanding of their duty to clarify provisions
in the WTO agreements that inherently contemplate calibration or enable flexible ‘policy space’ for WTO Members,40 and,
in turn, appear amenable to the application of a “principle of
proportionality” when interpreting ‘public policy calibration
provisions’.41 Apart from proportionality, various jurisprudential tests have also been developed in the interpretation of the
public policy calibration provisions in the WTO agreements, including, for example, tests of “reasonableness”42 as well as “ne40

Olivier Cattaneo, Has the WTO Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough?
Some Reflections on the Concept of ‘Policy Space’ 57, 77-78, in CHALLENGES
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO (2005) (“In practice, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have contributed to the preservation and broadening of Members’
policy space by emphasizing Members’ freedom to regulate as they wish, except to the extent that WTO provisions restrain them from doing so. For example in US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body recognized that WTO Members
‘have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement.’ In relation to several trade remedy provisions, panels and the Appellate Body have
pointed out that the methodology to be used is not prescribed and that Members may therefore determine what methodology to use. In Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages II, the Appellate Body similarly underlined that WTO rules ‘are
not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments in
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real
cases in the real world. Finally, in EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body recognized Members’ policy space by stating that ‘[w]e cannot lightly assume that
sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and recommendations. To sustain
such an assumption and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty
language far more specific and compelling than that found in Article 3 of the
SPS Agreement would be necessary”).
41
Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality and Balancing in
WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective 147, 166-67 in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES (2008); Axel Desmedt, Proportionality
in WTO Law, 4 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 3, 441-80 (2001); Andrew D. Mitchell, Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 5, 985-1008
(2007).
42
Catherine Button, The WTO’s ‘Objective Assessment’ Standard of Review and Panel Review of Health Measures 85-114 in CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 110 (Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005) (“Reasonableness also recommends itself as a standard of review because the concept is
familiar to panels and the WTO. First, the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement and GATT are all littered with references to obligations that are expressly qualified by the concept of reasonableness….Moreover, Panels and
the Appellate Body have frequently turned to reasonableness when interpreting the Agreements…In short, the concept of reasonableness is not entirely at
odds with GATT/WTO review”).
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cessity.”43 Ultimately, however, the scope of discretion that
WTO tribunals assume when crafting these tests turns on the
textual elasticity of each public policy calibration provision.
The following subsections sketch some of these differences.
1. General exceptions under GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV
The WTO Appellate Body and Panels have developed a
fairly substantial body of jurisprudence interpreting several of
the specific enumerated exceptions under GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XIV.44 These provisions operate as complete defenses for a WTO Member seeking to justify measures that
would ordinarily be trade-restrictive or would not otherwise
conform to any of the obligations under GATT or GATS.45
These exceptions do not apply to obligations other than those
under GATT and GATS, respectively.46 The Appellate Body
and Panels interpret GATT Article XX and GATS XIV following the same two-tiered methodology.47 First, by provisionally
43

See Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded
Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. OF
INT’L ECON. L. 1, 153-73 (2009); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services: The Best is Yet to Come, 19 EUR.
J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 2, 365-408 (2008); WTO: TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND SPS
MEASURES 94 (Anja Seibert-Fohr, Peter Tobias-Stoll & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.,
2007) (“When one applies the necessity test as developed by the panels and
the Appellate body, the existence of an international obligation to respect the
right in question will be a strong indicator of the importance of the values
protected by the measure, and even more so if the obligation has the status of
jus cogens”).
44
See ANTONIA ELIASON, ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 656-780 (4th ed., 2013); PETER VAN DEN
BOSSCHE AND WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 543-605 (3rd ed., 2013) [hereinafter VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND
ZDOUC].
45
See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
THE FUTURE 48 (1994); VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND ZDOUC, supra note 47, at 54647.
46
China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
¶ 307, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/D2395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30 2012).
47
See United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29 1996) (“In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only
come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j)
– listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by
the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered:
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examining if the WTO Member establishes that its defense applies under specific enumerated exception; and second, by determining if the WTO Member also demonstrates that the general requirements of the chapeau to the pertinent provision has
been met. Considering the extraordinary impact of GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV as defenses that would, if applicable, prevent any finding of liability for breach of WTO obligations from attaching to the WTO Member that issued the
challenged domestic measure, it is unsurprising that the Appellate Body and the Panels appear to strive for restraint when
calibrating the ordinarily trade-restrictive measure with the
WTO Member’s assertion of public policy interests as enumerated in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. For example,
the “public morals” specific exception in GATT Article XX(a)
and GATS Article XIV(b) refers to “standards of right and
wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or
nation.”48 In EU-Seal Products, the Appellate Body clarified
first, provisional justification by reason of the characterization of the measure…second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory
clauses of Article XX.”) [hereafter, “US-Gasoline Appellate Body Report”];
United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, ¶ 292, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (“Article XIV of the
GATS, like Article XX of the GATT 1994, contemplates a ‘two-tier analysis’ of
a measure that a Member seeks to justify under that provision. A panel
should first determine whether the challenged measure falls within the scope
of one of the paragraphs of Article XIV. This requires that the challenged
measure address the particular interest specified in that paragraph and
there be a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected.
The required nexus – or ‘degree of connection’ – between the measure and the
interest is specified in the language of the paragraphs themselves, through
the use of terms such as ‘relating to’ and ‘necessary to’. Where the challenged
measure has been found to fall within one of the paragraphs of Article XIV, a
panel should then consider whether that measure satisfies the requirements
of the chapeau of Article XIV”) [hereafter, “US-Gambling Appellate Body Report”].
48
China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.759,
WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12 2009) (“…The panel in US-Gambling, in an interpretation not questioned by the Appellate Body, found that ‘the term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf
of a community or nation’. The panel went on to note that ‘the content of
these concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a
range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious
values . . . Members, in applying this and other similar societal concepts,
‘should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts
of ‘public morals’ . . . in their respective territories, according to their own
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the nature of the balancing test to ascertain the necessity of
the challenged measure under the “public morals” exception:
As we noted, the Appellate Body has explained in several disputes that a necessity analysis involves a process of ‘weighing
and balancing’ a series of factors, including the importance of the
objective, the contribution of the measure to that objective, and
the trade-restrictiveness of the measure. The Appellate Body has
further explained that, in most cases, a comparison between the
challenged measure and possible alternatives should then be undertaken. As the Appellate Body has stated, ‘it is on the basis of
this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of measures, taking into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel determines whether a measure is ‘necessary’ or, alternatively,
whether another, WTO-consistent measures is ‘reasonably available’. Such an analysis, the Appellate Body has observed, involves a ‘holistic’ weighing and balancing exercise ‘that involves
putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating
them in relation to each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an overall judgment. A measure’s contribution is thus only one component of the necessity calculus
under Article XX. This means that whether a measure is ‘necessary’ cannot be determined by the level of contribution alone, but
will depend on the manner in which the other factors of the necessity analysis, including a consideration of potential alternative
measures, inform the analysis. It will also depend on the nature,
quantity, and quality of evidence, and whether a panel’s analysis
is performed in quantitative or qualitative terms. Indeed, the
very utility of examining the interaction between the various factors of the necessity analysis, and conducting a comparison with
potential alternative measures, is that it provides a means of
testing these factors as part of a holistic weighing and balancing
exercise, whether quantitative or qualitative in nature. The flexibility of such an exercise does not allow for the setting of predetermined thresholds in respect of any particular factor. If the
level of contribution alone cannot determine whether a measure
is necessary or not, we do not see that mandating in advance a
pre-determined threshold level of contribution would be instructive or warranted in a necessity analysis. 49

While tribunals have been quite deferential towards the
systems and scales of values”).
49
European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.214-15, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R
(May 22, 2014) [hereinafter EU-Seal Products, Appellate Body Report].
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WTO Member’s assertion of the content of “public morals,” they
nevertheless tend to be stringent when assessing whether the
challenged domestic measure indeed makes a ‘material contribution’ to the protection of such public morals. 50 Where a complaining party identifies an alternative measure that, in its
view, the responding WTO Member should have taken, the responding WTO Member thereafter assumes the burden of
showing why the proposed alternative is not ‘reasonably available’ in light of the interests or values pursued and the party’s
desired level of protection.51 The application of the GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV chapeau requirements (e.g. ‘arbitrary discrimination’) is also interpreted with particularity, depending on the nature of the specific enumerated exception
that the WTO member invokes as a defense.52 In EU-Seal
Products, the Appellate Body affirmed that the chapeau to
GATT Article XX refers to the “manner in which a measure. . .
is applied;” accordingly, it would be relevant to
50

China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶¶ 263-69,
294, WT/DSR63/AB/R, Dec. 21, 2009 (“[T]he Panel simply stated that limiting
the number of import entities ‘can make a material contribution’ to the protection of public morals in China. Yet, the Panel neither addressed quantitative projections nor provided qualitative reasoning based on evidence before it
to support that finding . . . For these reasons we disagree with the Panel’s
finding that China had met its burden of proof regarding the contribution of
the State plan requirement to the protection of public morals in China”)
[hereinafter China – Audiovisual Publications Appellate Body Report]; United
States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, ¶¶ 296-99, 304-06, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter USGambling Appellate Body Report].
51
China – Audiovisual Publications Appellate Body Report, supra note 53
at ¶¶ 319-332; US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 53 at ¶¶ 307311, 317 (“In our view, the Panel’s ‘necessity’ analysis was flawed because it
did not focus on an alternative measure that was reasonably available to the
United States to achieve the stated objectives regarding the protection of
public morals or the maintenance of public order. Engaging in consultations
with Antigua, with a view to arriving at a negotiated settlement that
achieves the same objectives as the challenged United States’ measures, was
not an appropriate alternative for the Panel to consider because consultations
are by definition a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore
not capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case”).
52
Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, ¶¶ 109-10, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 30 2004) [hereinafter Canada-Wheat Appellate Body Report]; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 120, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12 1998)
[hereinafter US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report].
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consider the design, architecture, and revealing structure of a
measure in order to establish whether the measure, in its actual
or expected application, constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. This involves a consideration of both ‘substantive
and procedural requirements’ under the measure at issue. 53

Applying this understanding of the chapeau requirements,
the Appellate body found that various features of the EU Seal
Regime constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail.54
Tribunals have also observed deference when it comes to a
WTO Member’s definition of environmental concerns within
the purview of measures necessary for the protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health under GATT Article XX(b) and
GATS Article XIV(b), or measures relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources under GATT Article XX(g).55
53

Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.302 WT/DS400/AB/R,
WT/DS401/AB/R
(May
22,
2014),
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/400_401abr_e.pdf.
54
Id. at ¶ 5.338 (“First, we found that the European Union did not show
that the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats seal products derived
from IC hunts as compared to seal products derived from ‘commercial’ hunts
can be reconciled with the objective of addressing EU public moral concerns
regarding seal welfare. Second, we found considerable ambiguity in the ‘subsistence’ and ‘partial use’ criteria of the IC exception. Given the ambiguity of
these criteria and the broad discretion that the recognized bodies consequently enjoy in applying them, seal products derived from what should in fact be
properly characterized as ‘commercial’ hunts could potentially enter the EU
market under the IC exception. We did not consider that the European Union has sufficiently explained how such instances can be prevented in the application of the IC exception. Finally, we were not persuaded that the European Union has made ‘comparable efforts’ to facilitate the access of the
Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with respect to the Greenland
Inuit. We also noted that setting up a ‘recognized body’ that fulfills all the
requirements of Article 6 of the Implementing Regulation may entail significant burdens in some instances.”).
55
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 7.1 WT/DS2/R (May 20,1996), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/438_444_445r_e.pdf
(“Under
the General Agreement, WTO Members were free to set their own environmental objectives, but they were bound to implement these objectives
through measures consistent with its provisions, notably those on the relative
treatment of domestic and imported products.”) [hereinafter US-Gasoline
Panel Report]; Id. at 30 (“Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and
in the Decision on Trade and Environment, there is specific acknowledgment
to be found about the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the
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To prove these environmental exceptions, tribunals retain a
“margin of discretion in assessing the value of evidence, and
the weight to be ascribed to that evidence.”56 While tribunals
observe deference towards how WTO Members identify and define their environmental objectives and targeted levels of environmental protection, the measures that they design to advance these objectives and meet these targets remain subject to
scrutiny. Thus, when invoking the exceptions under GATT Article XX(b) or GATS Article XIV(b), the WTO Member has to
satisfy the test of “necessity.”57 This test involves scrutiny of
the challenged measures’ contribution to the achievement of
the WTO Member’s environmental objective, looking at the
“genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective
pursued and the measure at issue. The selection of a methodology to assess a measure’s contribution is a function of the nature of the risk, the objective pursued, and the level of protection sought. It ultimately also depends on the nature, quantity,
and quality of evidence existing at the time the analysis is
made.”58 In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body further stressed
that “there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the GATT
1994 to quantify, as such, the risk to human life or health. A
risk may be evaluated in quantitative or qualitative terms. . . .
environment. WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with
trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they
enact and implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.”) [hereinafter Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline].
56
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 161, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.
12,
2001),
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf [hereinafter ECAsbestos Appellate Body Report].
57
See Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded
Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J INT’L
ECON. L. 1 , 153-173 (2009),; see also Filippo Fontanelli, Necessity Killed the
GATT – Article XX GATT and the Misleading Rhetoric about ‘Weighing and
Balancing’, 5 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 2, 36-56 (2012). (For the view that ‘no real
balancing is ever performed’, and that the process of construing the necessity
requirement is ‘arguably less value-neutral than the quasi-judicial bodies
claim it to be’).
58
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 145 WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), [hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report].
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it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”59 Along with the test of necessity,
the WTO Member has to show that there are no reasonably
available alternatives to achieve the desired level of health protection.60 Various factors would have to be considered in determining whether alternative measures are indeed ‘reasonably
available’ to protect human health including: 1) whether the
responding Member “could reasonably be expected to employ
[the alternative measure] to achieve its health policy objectives,” (in addition to showing the difficulty of implementation
of the challenged measure);61 2) whether the alternative measure “contributes to the realization of the end pursued…[particularly] the preservation of human life and
health;”62 and 3) “whether there is an alternative measure that
would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade
than a prohibition.”63 The materiality of the contribution of the
measure to the preservation of human life and health could be
quantitative or qualitative in nature. 64
Tribunals apply a similar necessity test in relation to the
environmental exception in GATT Article XX(g) on measures
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,
59

See Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
supra note 59, at ¶¶ 167-168.
60
See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra
note 58, at 14-22.
61
See Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
supra note 59, at ¶ 170.
62
Id. at ¶ 172.
63
Id.
64
See Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 61, at
¶ 151 (“In order to justify an import ban under Article XX(b), a panel must be
satisfied that it brings about a material contribution to the achievement of its
objective. Such a demonstration can of course be made by resorting to evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the present, that establish that the
import ban at issue makes a material contribution to the protection of public
health or environmental objectives pursued. This is not, however, the only
type of demonstration that could establish such a contribution. Thus, a panel
might conclude that an import ban is necessary on the basis of a demonstration that the import ban at issue is apt to produce a material contribution to
the achievement of its objective. This demonstration could consist of quantitative projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence.”). (Italics added).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3

24

3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/14/2015 4:41 PM

BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

573

if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”65 In USShrimp, the Appellate Body declared that the environmental
exception was not limited to mineral or non-living resources,
but extended to living species that “are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction,
frequently because of human activities.”66 The Appellate Body
further clarified that the term “natural resources” in GATT Article XX(g) was “not static in its content or reference but is raMoreover, the tradether by definition, evolutionary.”67
restrictive measure under GATT Article XX(g) also contemplates “even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions,” in
that counterpart restrictions should have also been placed on
domestically produced like products for the same conservationist reasons.68
Despite the seeming doctrinal smoothness of the balancing
methodology articulated by the Appellate Body and Panels, it
should nonetheless be stressed that the balancing performed
under the tests developed for the GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV exceptions is not a mathematically precise task.
Donald Regan points out the logical contradiction between saying that a WTO Member is entitled to choose its own legitimate
domestic goal and articulating the level of protection to achieve
such goal; at the same time the Member’s choice is subject to a
balancing test that exogenously compares the challenged
65

Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7 1990), at 21 [hereinafter, ThaiCigarettes Panel Report] (“The Panel could see no reason why under Article
XX the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ under paragraph (d) should not be the
same as in paragraph (b). In both paragraphs the same term was used and
the same objective intended: to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable”).
66
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 128 WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Appellate
Body
Report],
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf.
67
Id. at ¶ 130.
68
See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra
note 58, at 20-21; Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶¶ 5.242-5.252,
WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (Aug. 7, 2014), available
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/431_432_433abr_e.pdf.
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measure with any other less trade-restrictive ‘reasonably
available’ alternative. This contradictsthe WTO Member’s
choice as to the level of protection it desires.69 However, contradiction exists only if one presupposes that the WTO Member’s choices are unbounded in the first place, and if one chooses to forget that GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV are
also public policy calibration provisions by nature. In developing these jurisprudential tests, however, what the Appellate
Body and the Panels actually signal to WTO Members is that
they will observe a measure of deference or respect for what a
WTO Member identifies as its public policy objective or defines
as its public policy priority in relation to the specific exception
invoked in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. The Appellate Body and Panels do not deprive themselves of the power to
scrutinize the design of the measure as it relates to the
achievement of the public policy objective asserted by the WTO
Member, and therefore, such deference or respect given to the
GTO Members is not absolute. There is nothing illogical about
accepting that a WTO Member has chosen a particular public
policy objective while also testing whether the challenged
measure, as designed, is indeed tailored to meet the stated objective. A WTO Member’s ‘desired level of protection’ of public
health, environmental conservation, and other non-trade public
policies is not synonymous with the means that the WTO
Member may employ to reach that desired level of protection.
A more pressing point of critique against the jurisprudential tests set by the Appellate Body and the Panels is the amorphous nature of these legal tests, which has oscillated throughout WTO jurisprudence. This oscillation with undisclosed
reasons for the preferences between tests – between a “least
trade restrictiveness,” a “reasonableness test,” a “proportionality test,” or some combination of these concepts – has proven
more opaque than clear.70 The inconsistent legal tests may account for the difficulty WTO members experience in attempting
69

Donald H. Regan, The meaning of ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV
3, 347, 369 (2007).
70
See Massimiliano Montini, The Necessity Principle as an Instrument to
Balance Trade and the Protection of the Environment, 135,154,in
ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Franceso Francioni
ed., 2001).
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to establish a successful defense under GATT Article XX or
GATS Article XIV. Most recently, the Appellate Body reversed
the Panel’s findings in EU-Seal Products in regard to the chapeau requirements of GATT Article XX, “on the basis that the
Panel applied an incorrect legal test.”71 The Appellate Body
and the Panels could ensure better consistency in their interpretive practices if there were fewer instances of judicial crafting of what at this point ought to be settled criteria in the application of the general exceptions to both treaties. Oscillation
between various forms of tests and criteria does not lend any
reassurance of predictability in interpretation – particularly if
other as-yet untested specific exceptions in GATT Article XX
and GATS Article XIV are invoked as defenses in the future.
2. Balance of payments measures under Article XII and
Article XVIII:B of GATT 1994 and Article XII:1 GATS
WTO Members also retain regulatory freedom to implement ordinarily trade-restrictive measures to temporarily safeguard their external financial positions and/or to support the
implementation of their economic development programs.
GATT Article XII permits a Member to “restrict the quantity or
value of merchandise permitted to be imported” in order to
“safeguard its external financial position and its balance of
payments”.72 Import restrictions under this provision should
not exceed those necessary “to forestall the imminent threat of,
or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves” or “in the
case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to

71

See European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, supra note 56, at ¶ 6.1(d)(i); see Public Citizen, Only One of 40 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV
“General Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception
Construct Will Not Provide for an Effective TPP General Exception, available
at https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf (last accessed
Mar. 12,, 2015). (Note that a citizens’ advocacy paper reports that the GATT
Article XX defense “fails in 97 percent of cases.” As of this writing there has
only been one occasion where a GATT Article XX exception was successfully
established by a responding WTO Member and upheld by the Appellate
Body); see Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
supra note 59, at ¶ 192(f)..
72
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
194, at art. XII(1).
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achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves”.73 Members implementing domestic policies under this provision
should “pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring
equilibrium in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive resources…it is desirable to adopt
measures which expand rather than contract international
trade.”74 Quantitative restrictions imposed under this provision are subject to limitations, as well as requirements of notification, consultation, and review.75 GATT Article XVIII:B (on
Governmental Assistance to Economic Development) authorizes similar import restrictions taken by a “contracting party, the
economy of which can only support low standards of living and
is in the early stages of development,”76 for the dual purposes of
“safeguard[ing] its external financial position and to ensure a
level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its program of economic development.”77 The import restrictions authorized under GATT Article XVIII:B are subject to similar notification, consultation, and review requirements and
limitations.78
GATS Article XII:1 (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balanceof-Payments), on the other hand, provides that “[i]n the event
of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain re73

Id. at art. XII:2(a).
Id. at art.XII:3(a).
75
Id. at art. XII:4-5.
76
Id. at art.XVIII:4(a); see also Interpretative Notes from Annex I Ad Article
XVIII
on
paragraphs
1
and
4,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_03_e.htm (last accessed
Mar. 12, 2015) (stating that “[w]hen they consider whether the economy of a
contracting party ‘can only support low standards of living’, the Contracting
Parties shall take into consideration the normal position of that economy and
shall not base their determination on exceptional circumstances such as those
which may result from the temporary existence of exceptionally favourable
conditions for the staple export product or products of such contracting party”, and that the phrase ‘early stages of development’ is not meant to apply
only to contracting parties which have just started their economic development, but also to contracting parties the economies of which are undergoing a
process of industrialization to correct an excessive dependence on primary
production.”.)
77
Id. at art. XVIII:B(9).
78
See Marrakesh Agreement at art. XVIII:B(10)-(12).
74
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strictions on trade in services for which it has undertaken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for
transactions related to such commitments. It is recognized
that particular pressures on the balance of payments of a
Member in the process of economic development or economic
transition may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the implementation of its program of economic development or economic transition.”79 The permitted restrictions
should not be discriminatory; should be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; avoid
unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial
interests of any other Member; shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the emergency; and be temporary and phased
out progressively as the situation improves.80 Members can
give priority to the supply of services that are “more essential
to their economic or development programmes”, so long as the
restrictions are not adopted or maintained to protect a particular service sector.81 The restrictions taken under GATS Article
XII:1 are also subject to notification, consultation, and review
procedures.82
None of the foregoing balance-of-payments measures
(quantitative or import restrictions as well as restrictions of
trade in services) indicate a method for determining the adequacy of reserves (or conversely, the scope and extent of restrictions) necessary for the Member’s economic development
programming. The tribunal in India-Quantitative Restrictions
partially addressed this matter. In that case, India sought to
justify quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products through Article XVIII:B of GATT
1994.83 India argued that it was reasonable “to require a direct, and therefore, clear and foreseeable causal link between
the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the recurrence of balance-of-payments difficulties because the indi79

Id. at art. XII:1.
GATS, supra note 37, at Art. XII:2.
81
Id. at Art. XII:3
82
Id. at Art. XII:4 - XII:6.
83
Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter “India-Quantitative Restrictions Appellate Body Report”].
80
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rect consequences of a removal of restrictions on the external
financial position are difficult to trace and quantify;”84 accordingly, it was erroneous for the WTO panel to have required India “to use macroeconomic and other development policy instruments to meet balance-of-payments problems caused by the
immediate removal of its balance-of-payments restrictions.”85
India maintained that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of GATT
1994 (e.g. “Provided that no contracting party shall be required
to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change
in its development policy would render unnecessary the restrictions which it is applying under this Section.”86) and the
corresponding provision in Article XII:3(d)
make it clear that the balance-of-payments provisions permit the
imposition of restrictions, even if the Member has policy instruments at its disposal that could render the restrictions unnecessary. It is up to each Member to choose among those policy instruments, taking into account, not only the economic efficiency
considerations on which the IMF bases its policy advice, but also
its structural, institutional, and political constraints.”87 According to India, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “never stated that India could remove all restrictions at once, maintain its
existing policies, and face no balance-of-payments difficulties.88

The Appellate Body rejected India’s contentions, finding,
among others, that the IMF’s statement (e.g. that “the external
situation can be managed using macro-economic policy instruments alone…Quantitative restrictions (QRs) are not needed
for balance-of-payments commitments and should be removed
over a relatively short period of time…”89) did not imply any
prescribed change in India’s development policy,90 since “the
use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not related to any
particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Members regardless of the type of development policy they pur-

84

Id. at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 34.
86
Id. at ¶ 111.
87
Id. at ¶ 35.
88
India – Quantitative Restrictions Appellate Body Report, supra note 86,
at ¶ 37.
89
Id. at ¶ 123.
90
Id. at ¶ 130.
85
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sue.”91 Thus, it would appear from India – Quantitative Restrictions that the Appellate Body gives determinative weight
to IMF findings that a Member’s import restrictions are unnecessary to meet its balance-of-payments difficulties. At present,
there is no discernible method or legal criteria independently
developed by the Appellate Body for ‘balancing’ the WTO Member’s asserted objective of addressing a balance of payments
emergency or implementing an economic development program, with the WTO Member’s quantitative restrictions.
2.

SPS measures in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement

The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)92 regulates WTO
Members’ measures for protecting human, animal or plant life
or health from certain risks. An SPS measure is any measure
that is applied:
“(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory
of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment
or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory
of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or
feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals,
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or
spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws,
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods;
testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quar91

Id. at ¶ 126.
The WTO Agreement 1994, WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S.
493,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last accessed Mar
12, 2015) (hereinafter “SPS Agreement”).
92
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antine treatments including relevant requirements associated
with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of
risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.”93

SPS measures, in essence, illustrate the WTO Member’s
freedom to regulate to safeguard public health concerns. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement explicitly obligates Members to
“ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,”94 and where such
measures conform to the SPS Agreement, they are “presumed
to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members under
the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).”95 SPS measures have to be based on an “assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations.”96 With respect to sources of information for the
assessment of risks, the Members should “take into account
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods;
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest – or
disease – free areas; relevant ecological and environmental
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment.”97 When assessing the Member’s SPS measure in relation to the risk to animal or plant life or health and the appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection from such risk, Member “shall take
into account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage
in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control
or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and
the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to lim93

Id. at Annex A, § 1.
Id. at Art. 2.2.
95
Id. at Art. 2.4.
96
Id. at Art. 5.1.
97
Id.at Art. 5.2.
94
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iting risks.”98
WTO jurisprudence has not yet articulated the legal test
for determining how an SPS measure is “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health” under Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement, although it has been observed that Article 5.6
of the SPS Agreement builds on Article 2.2.99 Article 5.6 of the
SPS Agreement states:
“Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing
or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection,
Measures shall ensure that such measures are not more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical
and economic feasibility.”100

The footnote to Article 5.6 states that “[f]or purpose of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade-restrictive
than required unless there is another measure, reasonably
available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.”101
The Appellate Body affirmed the interpretation of this footnote
by the WTO panel in Australia-Salmon as the basis for a cumulative test of the reasonableness of an alternative measure: 1)
the alternative measure should be “reasonably available taking
into account technical and economic feasibility”; 2) it should
“achieve the Member’s appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection”; and 3) is “significantly less restrictive to
trade than the sanitary measure contested”.102 The characterization of “reasonableness” in the first element of the test, taking into account “technical and economic feasibility”, as well as
the determination of “appropriateness” of the level of SPS protection sought by the Member in the third element, has not, as
yet, been subjected by the Appellate Body or Panels to any substantive criteria.
98

SPS Agreement, supra note 95, at art. 5.3.
Van Den Bossche and Zdouc, supra note 47, at 905, 923-26.
100
SPS Agreement, supra note 95, at art. 5.6.
101
Id. at art. 5.6, n. 3 (emphasis added).
102
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, ¶ 194, WT/DS18/AB/R (Nov. 6 1998).
99
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2. Technical regulations under Article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement
States also retain regulatory freedom to impose technical
regulations for legitimate public policy objectives. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) regulates WTO Members’ technical regulations, defined as a “document which lays down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they
apply to a product, process or production method.”103 According
to the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos, product characteristics
“include, not only features and qualities intrinsic to the product
itself, but also related ‘characteristics’, such as the means of
identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product”;104 compliance with product characteristics is “mandatory”;105 and the technical regulation should apply to an identifiable product or group of products.106 Article 2.1. of the TBT
Agreement indicates the non-discrimination requirements for
technical regulations,107 while Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement regulates WTO Members’ technical regulations in relation to their legitimate public objectives:
“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of
the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives
103

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm (last accessed Mar.
12, 2015), at Annex 1, paragraph 1. [hereinafter, “TBT Agreement”].
104
EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 59, at para. 67.
105
Id. at ¶ 68.
106
Id. at ¶ 70.
107
TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.1 (“Members shall ensure
that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory
of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in
any other country.”).
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are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available
scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products.”108

Technical regulations are not of an indefinite duration –
they should not be maintained “if the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the
changed circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less
trade-restrictive manner.”109 Unlike the explicit provision in
Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement, compliance with the TBT
Agreement does not give rise to a presumption that a technical
barrier to trade is also consistent with GATT rules.110 The Appellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes stressed that the “object
and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization
and, on the other hand, Member’s right to regulate….Article
2.1. should not be interpreted as prohibiting any detrimental
impact on competitive opportunities for imports in cases where
such detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions.”111 To determine whether the
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against
the group of imported products, the Appellate Body mandated
panels to “carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances of
the case, that is, the design, architecture, revealing structure,
108

TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.2 (emphasis added); see also
Simon Lester and William Stemberg, The GATT Origins of TBT Agreement
Articles 2.1 and 2.2, 17 J. INT’L ECON L. 1, 215-32 (2014) (commenting on the
normative genealogy of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement from GATT).
109
TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.3.
110
Christine Wolff, Regulating Trade in GMOs: Biotechnology and the
WTO, in TRADING IN GENES: DEVELOPMENT PERSCPETIVES ON BIOTECHNOLOGY,
TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 217, 217-34 (2005) (“The relationship between the
TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 is less clear. In the preamble, WTO
Members state their desire to further the objective of GATT 1994, but there is
no presumption of consistency with GATT for measures that comply with the
TBT Agreement.”).
111
Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 174, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report].
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operation, and application of the technical regulation at issue,
and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is evenhanded, in order to determine whether it discriminates against
the group of imported products.”112 As such, the particular
cause of the detrimental impact is significant for purposes of
establishing a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement – if
the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a “legitimate
regulatory distinction” then there is no such violation.113 However, it should also be borne in mind that for detrimental impacts from regulatory distinctions to be “legitimate”, such distinctions must be applied in an even-handed manner, as
stressed by the Appellate Body in US – COOL: “where a regulatory distinction is not designed and applied in an evenhanded manner – because, for example, it is designed or applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination – that distinction cannot be considered ‘legitimate’, and thus the detrimental impact will reflect
discrimination prohibited under Article 2.1.”114 The evenhandedness of a legitimate regulatory distinction can be shown
from the manner by which the challenged technical regulation
responds to the public risks subject of the regulatory distinction.115
2.

Article 8.1 in relation to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement

Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement defines the balancing objectives of the Agreement which states: “The protection and
112

Id. at ¶ 182.
Id. at ¶ 216.
114
Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, ¶ 271, WT/DS384/AB/R (June 29, 2012).
115
Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 297, WT/DS381/AB/R
(May 16, 2012) (“…we conclude that the United States has not demonstrated
that the difference in labeling conditions for tuna products containing tuna
caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna
products containing tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP,
on the other hand, is ‘calibrated’ to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of the ocean. It follows from this that
the United States has not demonstrated that the detrimental impact of the
US measure on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction…”) [hereinafter US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body
Report].
113

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance
of rights and obligations.”116 Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “Members may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”117 Article 8.1 in
relation to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement has not yet been
squarely adjudicated or interpreted by the Appellate Body, but
these provisions were repeatedly referred to in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products to demonstrate the
“public interest” dimension of TRIPS that could assist in interpreting exceptions under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.118
Read alongside Article 7, Article 8.1 does not appear to create
the effect of an exception under the TRIPS Agreement, but rather operates as a principle that affirms that Members’ domestic measures can protect specific public interests in ways that
do not violate the TRIPS Agreement.119As can be seen from the
plain texts of Articles 7 and 8.1, what is contemplated from
Members’ domestic actions or measures that vindicate public
116

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 7, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization,
Annex
1C,
1869
U.N.T.S.
401,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm
[hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
117
Id. at art. 8.1.
118
Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
¶ 4.10(d), 4.30(a), WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
119
See Sisule F. Musungu, The Trips Agreement and Public Health, in
431 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 421-70 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2008) (“Article 8 therefore
expressly grants permission to WTO Members to introduce measures that are
necessary to protect public health among other public policy objectives including measures to prevent the abuse of the exclusive rights conferred by patents and to foster innovation and R&D as well as the transfer of technology
in the pharmaceutical sector…Article 8 should be read as establishing the
primacy of public health considerations, both in terms of innovation, R&D,
and transfer of technology and access to medicines in the formulation and
amendment of laws to implement TRIPS.”).
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values is a balancing with other values protected under the
TRIPS Agreement, such as innovation, research and development. The concluding proviso within Article 8.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly requires that the Member’s domestic
measures taken for public interest protection be “consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.” It was for this reason
that Canada did not directly invoke Article 8.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement as an independent defense in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, but merely as a contextual
principle to emphasize that public health and public interest
values form part of the spectrum of values that ought to inform
the interpretation of exceptions to patents authorized under
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.120 At best, Article 8.1 of
the TRIPS Agreement has been argued to have an evidentiary
effect of a presumption of consistency with TRIPS:
“The constraint in Article 8.1, as it was finally adopted, is that
the measures they adopt should not violate the terms of the
agreement. The UNCTAD IPRs Resource Book suggests that
‘measures adopted by Members to address public health, nutrition and matters of vital socio-economic importance should be
presumed to be consistent with TRIPS, and that any Member
seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion should bear the burden of proving inconsistency….This approach presumes that the
sequence of examination begins with whether the measures are
of the kind envisioned, and if they are, then it goes on to address
the issue of whether they are inconsistent…Under such an approach, there therefore exists a difference in scope between Article 30 and Article 8. Thus, where a measure is aimed specifically
to ‘protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development’ then Article 8 would create a presumption that the measure is consistent, which must be rebutted
by the complainant…Article 8 would thus shift the burden for
public interest measures whereas all other measures would be
directly addressed by Articles 30 and 31…This approach however
only allows Article 8.1 to have a burden shifting role in certain
situations….[it] does not negate the fact that compliance with Ar120

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119, at art. 30. (“Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of a
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
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ticle 8.1 would remain dependent on either not violating a right
granted by a provision or by coming within the boundaries of an
exception or limitation enumerated elsewhere in the TRIPS
Agreement. There would still be no substantive effect to the first
half of Article 8.1.”121

Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement requires the Member
to establish that the challenged measure meet two elements:
first, that the measure is indeed necessary to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance; and second, that the
measure remains consistent with TRIPS.122 Whether the Appellate Body and Panels will propose the “reasonableness” or
“rational relationship” tests between the objective of promoting
public interest and the TRIPS-consistency of the challenged
measure remains a matter to be anticipated.
2.

PROVISIONS ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
(S&D)

There are numerous provisions on special and differential
treatment (S&D) for developing countries and least developed
countries (LDCs) in the WTO agreements, but to date none of
them have been interpreted in a concrete WTO dispute. While
SDT provisions are known to afford a degree of flexibility for
developing countries and LDCs, the WTO Appellate Body and
panels have not yet had an occasion to interpret these provisions, whether as positive obligations, as some form of interpretive defense when a developing country or LDC imposes ordinarily trade-restrictive measures, or as a deferential or flexible
standard of review.123 The 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference
121

Dalindyebo Shabalala, Challenges for Technology Transfer in the Climate Change Arena: What Interactions with the TRIPS Agreement in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 507, 530-31
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).
122
See PING XIONG, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 153-54 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).
123
The argument has been made that the S&D principle could operate as
a “broader principle” for interpreting obligations under the WTO agreements,
as well as in relation to the inherent jurisdiction of the Appellate Body with
respect to procedural aspects of dispute settlement. Andrew D. Mitchell, A
Legal Principle of Special and Differential Treatment for WTO Disputes, 5
WORLD TRADE REV. 3, 445-69 (2006). See also Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special
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in Doha declared that provisions for special and differential
treatment are an “integral part of the WTO Agreements”, and
in turn, ordered the review of such provisions “with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective
and operational”.124 The WTO Secretariat has since conducted
a comprehensive review of the S&D provisions throughout the
WTO agreements and the decisions of the WTO political organs.125 S&D provisions were classified according to six categories: 1) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities
of developing country Members; 2) provisions under which
WTO Members should safeguard the interests of developing
country Members; 3) flexibility of commitments, of action, and
use of policy instruments; 4) transitional time periods; 5) technical assistance; and 6) provisions relating to least developed
country (LDC) Members.126 A developing country or LDC
Member’s obligations as a State Party to the ICESCR can help
substantiate and provide fuller information on how a Member
could fall well within the standards that often trigger S&D
flexibility, such as “economic development programming needs”
in the balance-of-payments provisions previously discussed under GATT Article XVIII:B. In GATT Article XVIII:7(a), a
Member can seek negotiations to modify or withdraw concessions “in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of
and Differential Treatment, 27 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291-317 (2004).
124
World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶ 4. See also Decision Adopted by the
General Council of 1 August 2004, WT/l/579, ¶ 1 available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm#
sd (instructing the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session
to “expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreementspecific proposals and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 2005. The Council further instructs the Committee, within the parameters of the Doha mandate, to address all other outstanding work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the monitoring
mechanism and the incorporation of S&D treatment into the architecture of
WTO rules, as referred to in TN/CTD/7 and report, as appropriate, to the
General Council.”).
125
Committee on Trade and Development, Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions: Note by the Secretariat,
WT/COMTD/W/196
(June
14,
2013)
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisio
ns_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Secretariat SDT Note].
126
Id. at 3-4.
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its people”.127 No legal criteria or jurisprudential tests have
been developed to date as to the S&D provisions.
As seen from the foregoing, the DSU’s adoption of the Appellate Body and Panel Reports indicates that interpretive development of public policy calibration provisions result in different approaches to balancing trade and non-trade public
policies. Much depends on what public policy provisions a responding WTO Member invokes at the DSU in responding to a
fellow WTO Member’s complaint. As far as general exceptions
under GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV are concerned,
such provisions have not been empirically proven as realistically successful defenses for responding WTO Members. While
the Appellate Body and Panels are generally conscious of the
importance of balancing, the proliferation of jurisprudential
tests to undertake balancing makes it difficult and unpredictable to rely on public policy calibration provisions in the WTO
agreements as legal defenses.
A. Public Policy in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM)
A 2007 study averred that the contemporary political processes of negotiations, trade policy reviews, and WTO waiver
decisions and Ministerial Conference discussions and practices
already reflect the reality that “WTO members increasingly
127

GATT, supra note 37, at art. XVIII:7 (“If a contracting party coming
within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article considers it desirable, in
order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to
raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a
concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement,
it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect and enter into negotiations with any contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agreement is reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be
free to modify or withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to
this Agreement in order to give effect to such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved.”). See id. at art. XVIII:13 (“If a contracting
party coming within the scope of paragraph 4(a) of this Article finds that governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular
industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people,
but that no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is
practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions
and procedures set out in this Section.”).
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seek to reconcile their trade and human rights objectives,”128 in
particular revealing that: 1) accession applications frequently
include questions on rule of law and the compliance with human rights by the applicant States;129 2) the WTO had already
issued its first waiver specifically to protect human rights, e.g.
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to prevent trading
in conflict diamonds;130 3) human rights concerns were increasingly being litigated in the dispute settlement system through
GATT Article XX exceptions;131 4) trade policy reviews conducted by the TPRB systematically engage questions of social and
environmental impacts of, and human rights considerations in,
Member States’ trade policies;132 and 5) trade negotiations under the Doha Round increasingly reflect the prioritization of
human rights obligations as the premise of the global development agenda.133 Other scholars confirm various aspects of this
evolving phenomenon to accommodate and coordinate human
rights in the political organs and processes of the WTO system.134
The TPRM remains a work in progress as to systematically
obtaining information relating to trade and non-trade public
policies of WTO Members. The TPRM is a dialogic process between the WTO and its individual Members, involving an assessment of the latters domestic trade policies in relation to
WTO commitments. Its declared purpose is
to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade
128

Susan Ariel Aaronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are Penetrating the WTO, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 3, 1-37 (2007).
129
Id. at 12-15.
130
Id. at 16.
131
Id. at 18-22.
132
Id. at 22-26.
133
Id. at 27-32.
134
See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Effective Implementation of Intersecting Public International Law Regimes: Environment, Development, and
Trade Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 213-58 (Ashgate 2009); Christopher Butler,
Comment, Human Rights and the World Trade Organization: The Right to
Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement, 5 U. PA. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
(2007); Abadir M. Ibrahim, International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished Debate, 14 GERMAN L.J. 321, 334-36 (2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3

42

3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/14/2015 4:41 PM

BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

591

Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.
Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective
appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific
obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members.” 135

While the assessment in the TPRM takes into consideration “the background of the wider economic and developmental
needs, policies and objectives of the Member concerned, as well
as of its external environment,” its main function is “to examine the impact of a Member’s trade policies and practices on the
multilateral trading system.”136 On the other hand, the Trade
Policy Review Body (TPRB) of the WTO conducts the programme of reviews and actual sessions of review.137 Despite
the breadth of the subject-matter that could be covered under
the TPRM, considering the “developmental needs, policies, and
objectives of the Member concerned, these policies are not
evaluated as to their impact on human rights or compliance
with other international commitments. Democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and the protection of labour rights have
generally been overlooked, although there recently have been
references to ‘social stability.’”138
Recent trade policy review reports written by the WTO
Secretariat do reflect some institutional awareness of the impacts of trade policies on income inequalities and social protection. However, the trade policy reviews still do not require any
disclosure by the WTO Member of its international social protection commitments and the status of its compliance with such
135

Trade Policy Review Mechanism ¶ A(i), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available
at http://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/
tprm_01_e.htm.
136
Id. at ¶ A(ii).
137
See M. Benzing, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in WOLFRUM, STOLL,
& KAISER 619-34 (2006) (explaining trade policy review sessions conducted by
the TPRB).
138
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 750 (Routledge, 4th ed. 2013).
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commitments. For example, as reflected under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the disclosure of WTO Members’ international obligations, such as the
rights to work, favourable conditions of work, and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, social security, and education are not required. The WTO Secretariat Report for the Second Trade Policy Review of Panama, a State
Party to the ICESCR,139 specifically noted that
there remain considerable social and regional inequalities and a
significant shortage of skilled labour… It would also be wise to
reassess, and where appropriate, rationalize the incentive
schemes in order to narrow the gap between the most vigorous
economic zones and sectors and the rest of the economy, and to
allocate more resources to social programmes, including improvements in the quality of education in order to meet the demand for skilled labour on which sustainable economic growth
depends.140

The same report also noted Panama’s environmental commitments in other treaties such as the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.141 On the
other hand, Brazil’s Sixth Trade Policy Review reported that
its sustained economic growth from trade enabled it to reduce
poverty and income inequality.142 The WTO Secretariat report
for the fifth Trade Policy Review of China143 referred to China’s
domestic measures to protect state security, public morals, environmental concerns, and international commitments, but
made no specific mention of China’s duties as a State Party to
the ICESCR. Amongst many duties, China must:
139

United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter ICESCR].
140
Secretariat Report, Second Trade Policy Review of Panama, ¶ 2,
WT/TPR/S/301
(June
18,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s301_e.pdf.
141
Id. at ¶ 3.139.
142
Secretariat Report, Sixth Trade Policy Review of Brazil, ¶ 3,
WT/TPR/S/283
(May
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s283_e.pdf. Brazil acceded to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on January
24, 1992. See generally ICESCR, supra note 142.
143
China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights on March 27, 2001. See generally ICESCR, supra note 142.
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Import licensing, restrictions and prohibitions are maintained on
grounds of state security; public morality, human, animal and
plant health; environmental protection; balance of payment reasons; and to comply with international commitments. China uses
both automatic and non-automatic licensing. Goods subject to
any of the restrictions are listed in Catalogues issued by the relevant agencies. However, these lists can be adjusted as necessary,
and imports of goods that are not included in the Catalogue can
be restricted or prohibited on a temporary basis by the relevant
authorities.144

Likewise, India145 indicated that its import restrictions
may be imposed on the grounds of
health, safety, moral and security reasons, and for self-sufficiency
and balance-of-payments reasons. On occasion, India links the
use of trade policy instruments to domestic policy considerations.
For instance, import restrictions and licensing requirements are
relaxed when imports are necessary to alleviate inflation or supply shortages. State trading is also used as a policy tool to ensure, inter alia, a ‘fair’ return to farmers, food security, the supply of fertilizer to farmers, and the functioning of the domestic
price support system…India grants direct and indirect assistance
to various sectors…the states also provide additional subsidies,
especially for basic services such as education and health, electricity, and water. Price controls, which apply to some commodities, are aimed at providing subsidies to farmers and a population under the poverty line, and to ensure ‘reasonable price’ of
quality drugs.146

Indonesia147 also cites similar reasons as grounds for the
authority of the Ministry of Trade to prohibit exports: “a national security or public interest threat (including social, cultural and moral reasons); protection of intellectual property
rights; protection of human life and health; protection of the
environment and ecology; and signature and ratification of in144

Secretariat Report, Fifth Trade Policy Review of China, ¶ 19,
WT/TPR/S/300
(May
27,
2014),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s300_e.pdf.
145
India acceded to the ICESCR on April 10, 1979. See generally
ICESCR, supra note 142.
146
Secretariat Report, Fifth Trade Policy Review of India, ¶3, 5,
WT/TPR/S/249
(Aug.
10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp349_e.htm.
147
Indonesia acceded to the ICESCR on 23 February 2006. See generally
ICESCR, supra note 142.
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ternational treaties or agreements by the Government.”148
None of these reports, however, articulate the WTO Member’s
continuing duties as a State Party to the ICESCR, and the status of social protection in their respective countries where they
report in the periodic review before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Arguably, the European Union demonstrates the most remarkable trade policy review practices in regard to reflecting
economic, social and cultural rights as part of its trade policymaking. The European Union stressed that its trade policy “is
required to address developmental, environmental, and social
objectives, and contribute to the objectives set out in the Treaty
on the European Union, including development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect of human
rights”,149 and for this reason the European Commission
carries out impact-assessment analysis to support its decisionmaking for all proposals with significant direct impact, including
in the trade policy area. The impact-assessment process assesses
different policy options by comparing both potential benefits and
costs in economic, social and environmental terms. The system
relies on stakeholder consultations, and impact-assessment reports are published once the Commission’s decision has been taken. In the case of trade negotiations, the Commission carries out
‘trade sustainability impact assessments’ (SIAs) to analyze the
economic, environmental and social impact of the EU trade
agreements for the EU and its trading partners. SIAs inform negotiations and are independent studies conducted by external
consultants, involving comprehensive consultation of stakeholders to ensure a high degree of transparency and taking account of
the knowledge and concerns of relevant interest groups both in
the EU and in the trading partner. The Commission is committed to better assessing the impact of trade initiative including
carrying out ex-post analysis of agreement implementation. 150

In contrast, other major players in the trading system do
not appear to have taken a similar route of embedding human
148

Secretariat Report, Sixth Trade Policy Review of Indonesia, ¶ 3.77,
WT/TPR/S/278
(Mar.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s278_e.pdf.
149
Secretariat Report, Eleventh Trade Policy Review of the European Union,
¶
2.12,
WT/TPR/S/284
(May
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s284_e.pdf.
150
Id. at ¶ 2.15.
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rights compliance in trade policy reviews. The most recent
Trade Policy Review for the United States (a signatory but not
a State Party to the ICESCR), the Trade Policy Review for Japan (a State Party to the ICESCR), and the Trade Policy Review for Canada, all did not indicate any impacts of trade policies, and are virtually silent on issues of domestic income
inequality, as well as social and environmental protection.151
The ultimate effectiveness of the WTO’s TPRM as a surveillance mechanism as a “managerial”, “compliance pull”, or
“peer review” process152 depends on the extent to which the
process is used by the WTO Members to fully unveil critical issues in the public policy objectives behind their regulatory
measures. Apart from the examining the technical requirements of trade commitments in the WTO agreements, WTO
Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR could themselves initiate the periodic dialogue with the WTO on the very
same public policies that undergird their exercise of regulatory
freedom.
A.

Public Policy in WTO Trade Negotiations

Where the WTO Member who is, for example, also one of
the 162 State Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), cannot avail of
the legal calibration afforded by broad provisions in the WTO
agreements that affirm regulatory freedom to protect public
policies, it is not prohibited from seeking to obtain such flexibility in complying with trade commitments through decisions of
the WTO political organs. 153 The Ministerial Conference of the
151

See Secretariat Report, Eleventh Trade Policy Review of the United
States,
WT/TPR/S/275
(Nov.
13,
2012),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp375_e.htm; Secretariat Report,
Eleventh Trade Policy Review of Japan, WT/TPR/S/276 (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp376_e.htm; Secretariat
Report, Trade Policy Review of Canada, WT/TPR/S/246 (May 4, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp346_e.htm.
152
See SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A
REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 160-61 (2003) (“Although
the TPRM, in carrying out these policy reviews, engages in the evaluation of
Member’s regulations and policies for ‘consistency’ with the WTO system, it is
a managerial, rather than ‘enforcement’ mechanism. In other words, it
amounts to a ‘peer review’ process.”).
153
See Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO
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WTO – the institution’s supreme decision-making body – has
the power to adopt authoritative interpretations under Article
IX:2 of the WTO Agreement,154 the power to adopt amendment
decisions under Article X:1 of the WTO Agreement,155 and the
power to issue waivers of WTO commitments under Article
IX:3 of the WTO Agreement.156
for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L
L.
615,
618
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=1853&issue=92 [hereinafter Feichtner
EJIL 2009].
154
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, at art. IX:2 (“The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to
adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements. In the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1, they shall exercise their authority on the basis of a recommendation by the Council overseeing the functioning of that Agreement. The
decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority
of the Members. This paragraph shall not be used in a manner that would
undermine the amendment provisions in Article X.”).
155
Id. at art. X:1 (“Any Member of the WTO may initiate a proposal to
amend the provisions of this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1 by submitting such proposal to the Ministerial Conference.
The Councils listed in paragraph 5 of Article IV may also submit to the Ministerial Conference proposals to amend the provisions of the corresponding
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1 the functioning of which they
oversee. Unless the Ministerial Conference decides on a longer period, for a
period of 90 days after the proposal has been tabled formally at the Ministerial Conference any decision taken by the Ministerial Conference to submit
the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance shall be taken by
consensus. Unless the provisions of paragraphs 2, 5, or 6 apply, that decision
shall specify whether the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 4 shall apply. If consensus is reached, the Ministerial Conference shall forthwith submit the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance. If consensus is not
reached at a meeting of the Ministerial Conference within the established period, the Ministerial Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the
Members whether to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance. Except as provided in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6, the provisions of paragraph 3 shall apply to the proposed amendment, unless the Ministerial Conference decides by a three-fourths majority of the Members that the
provisions of paragraph 4 shall apply.”).
156
Id. at art. IX:3 (“In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that any such
decision shall be taken by three fourths of the Members unless otherwise
provided for in this paragraph. (a) A request for a waiver concerning this
Agreement shall be submitted to the Ministerial Conference for consideration
pursuant to the practice of decision-making by consensus. The Ministerial
Conference shall establish a time-period, which shall not exceed 90 days, to
consider the request. If consensus is not reached during the time-period, any
decision to grant a waiver shall be taken by three fourths of the Members. (b)
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The power to adopt authoritative interpretations of the
WTO covered agreements lies exclusively with the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council.157 While there have been
attempts to invoke this power,158 to date the required vote has
not yet been obtained for the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council to adopt an authoritative interpretation of any
provision of the WTO covered agreements, partly owing to the
difficulties of mustering the required three-fourths majority to
enact such an authoritative interpretation, the fact that Members have been able to operate within the WTO system (especially the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) without
having to resort to rallying political machinery at the Ministerial Conference to muster the required vote, and also out of reluctance due to the uncertain consequences of an authoritative
interpretation on dispute settlement.159 Accordingly, while

on sheer numbers alone WTO Members who are States
Parties to the ICESCR might well be able to muster the
required three-fourths majority to obtain authoritative interpretations of WTO provisions that may implicate their
ICESCR obligations,160 it may not be necessarily the prudent
decision for them to do so, given the ripple consequences of an

A request for a waiver concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1A or 1B or 1C and their annexes shall be submitted initially to the
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services or the Council
for TRIPS, respectively, for consideration during a time-period which shall
not exceed 90 days. At the end of the time-period, the relevant Council shall
submit a report to the Ministerial Conference.”).
157
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, ¶ 19-20, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25,
1997),
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds33_e.htm.
158
See Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article
IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement of the World Trade Organization,
WT/GC/W/133 (Jan. 25, 1999) (commenting on the interpretation of Articles
3.7, 21.5, 22.2, 22.6, 22.7, and 23 of the DSU).
159
See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 4, 803-24 (2005). DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND
INVESTMENT 242 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
160
See Caroline Dommen, Safeguarding the Legitimacy of the Multilateral Trading System: The Role of Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 121, 131
(Frederick M. Abbott, Christine Kaufmann, Thomas Cottier eds., 2006).
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authoritative interpretation of WTO provisions throughout the
entire system, especially on pending and future WTO disputes.161
For similar reasons, political support for an amendment
any of the WTO covered agreements may be difficult to obtain.162 In practice, taking decisions by voting at the WTO –
instead of the usual consensus decision-making process163 –
rarely occurs in the WTO system.164 The first amendment proposed and recommended for a WTO covered agreement is the
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement that would make the
2003 waiver decision165 for essential medicines permanent and
built into the TRIPS Agreement.166 WTO Members have a
deadline of 31 December 2015 to have a two-thirds majority
approve the amendment.167 For Members that formally accept
161

See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) (“…If, in the authoritative interpretation, both disputing parties agree to change the law retroactively so as to apply it also to their dispute, the judicial decision, in so far as it relies on the old
law, would lose its practical effect: if the complainant had won the dispute on
the basis of the ‘old law’, that party, having agreed to the ‘new law’, would no
longer seek…the implementation of the judicial decision; if, in contrast, the
defendant had won the original dispute, the complainant would need to seek
a new panel decision for it to see the ‘new law’ applied to its case…”).
162
See William J. Davey, Institutional Framework, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 51, 70 (Patrick F.J.
Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G. Plummer eds., 2007).
163
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 12 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2006) (“…consensus differs from unanimity. In consensus decision-making, the minority will normally go along with the majority unless it
has a serious objection. The majority will, in turn, not ramrod decisions
through by vote but will deal with the objections of the minority. The consensus decision-making process takes a great deal of time. Voting occurs in the
WTO only when a decision cannot be taken by consensus. In the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council, decisions are taken by ‘a majority of the
votes cast’ unless otherwise specified in the relevant WTO agreement. Each
Member has one vote…”).
164
See VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 47, at 142.
165
See General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540
(Sept.
1,
2003),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
166
See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
WT/L/641
(Dec.
8,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
167
See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement –
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the amendment, they will take effect and replace the 2003
waiver decision for those Members. For the remaining members that do not accept the amendment, the waiver will continue to apply until the Member accepts the amendment and it
takes effect.168
Finally, WTO Members who are States Parties to the
ICESCR may also seek to fulfill duties to respect, protect, and
fulfill ICESCR rights through methods of international cooperation, by mustering the required three-fourths majority of the
Members to wield the waiver decision powers of the Ministerial
Conference. Some of the more recent waiver decisions of the
Ministerial Conference include the December 14, 2001 Waiver
Decision on the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific states)EC (European Communities) Partnership Agreement,169 the
2003 Waiver Decision Concerning the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (in regard to restrictions
on trade in diamonds from conflict zones),170 the 2002 Waiver
Decision exempting LDCs from having to provide exclusive
marketing rights for any new drugs in the period when they do
not provide patent protection,171 as well as the 2003 waiver decision for essential medicines in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. Waiver decisions can be differentiated between those
that “are granted for concretely defined measures or situations…to coordinate WTO law with other international legal
regimes”, and those adopted “to legalize abstractly defined
Fourth Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol
Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/899 (Nov. 27, 2013), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.
168
Id.
169
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, European Communities – the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement,
WT/MIN(01)/15
(Nov.
14,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_
e.htm.
170
See Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (Feb. 24, 2003),
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=49791,3681,42337,43438&CurrentCa
talogueIdIndex=0&FullTextSearch=.
171
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to
Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002),
available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm.
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measures for all or groups of members…includ[ing] the 1971
waivers to legalize preferential tariff treatment by developed
contracting parties under the Generalized System of Preferences and among developing countries, which were both succeeded by the Enabling Clause of 1999…[and] the 1999 waiver
to enable developing country members to maintain trade preferences for products from least developed countries”, among
others.172 The 2003 waiver decision on essential medicines is
one such decision exemplifying compliance with duties of the
States Parties to the ICESCR to respect, protect, and fulfill
ICESCR rights, specifically Article 12 of the ICESCR on the
right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. However, much as securing sufficient political leverage and support
for the required majority vote would not be easy for approving
authoritative interpretations or amending provisions of the
WTO agreements, obtaining a waiver decision as a means for
realizing ICESCR rights is likewise not always a politically
feasible option for WTO Members who are States Parties to the
ICESCR.
Perhaps an equally, if not more, strategic route for WTO
Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR to ensure that
WTO decision-making fully takes into account the realization
of ICESCR rights would be in wielding the agenda-setting power in the WTO, where developing countries, and particularly
emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and China have started
to take a more active role, especially on food and agriculture
negotiations.173 The Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996
witnessed political tussles between the United States (which
preferred to launch a narrow trade agenda at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting), and the European Union (which “wanted to
include a large number of topics including the environment, labor, trade remedies, investment and competition”). Developing
countries preferred to emphasize “agriculture, trade in manufactures and tropical products, implementation issues relating
to the Uruguay Round agreements, issues related to debt,
technical assistance and capacity-building, and the reform of
172

See Feichtner EJIL 2009, supra note 156, at 621.
See Brendan Vickers, The Role of the BRICS in the WTO: SystemSupporters or Change Agents in Multilateral Trade?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 254, 261 (Amrita Narlikar,
Martin Daunton & Robert M. Stern eds., 2012).
173
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the decision-making procedures.”174 The stalled Doha Development Agenda reflects increasing tensions in the relationship
between trade and key aspects of economic, social and cultural
rights that are intrinsic to development. The Doha Ministerial
Declaration affirmed the Members’ commitment to the objective of sustainable development, stressing the balance between
trade and social protection in that “the aims of upholding and
safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral
trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and
must be mutually supportive…recogniz[ing] that under WTO
rules no country should be prevented from taking measures for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of
the environment at the levels it considers appropriate, subject
to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements.”175 Areas
identified under the Work Programme in the Doha Ministerial
Declaration all involve crucial issues of economic, social and
cultural rights – from special and differential treatment for developing countries in agricultural and non-agricultural products; the protection of biodiversity and indigenous knowledge
and access to essential medicines in relation to the TRIPS
agreement; obtaining a development-based policy analysis of
the relationship between trade and investment; technical assistance and transparency with respect to issues involving the interaction of trade and competition policy as well as government
procurement matters; trade facilitation special needs of developing country Members and LDC Members; negotiations on the
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements;
recommendations on trade, debt, and finance; and targeted

174

SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 91 (Oxford University
Press, 2012).
175
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001,
¶6,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41
I.L.M.
746,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#specia
l [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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technical assistance for LDCs.176 There is no better time for
WTO Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR to draw
upon their obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill ICESCR
rights to inform the content of their negotiations than in the
present Doha Development Round.177
As seen in the foregoing subsections, there are segmented
efforts to achieve “balance” between trade and non-trade public
policy objectives, the three core functional pillars of the WTO,
and the counterpart institutions that oversee such functions.
The following section identifies some dissonance between the
voices that get to weigh in on these balancing processes, and
those often excluded from public policy decision-making at the
WTO.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTIONAL DEFICITS AT THE WTO:
WHO UNDERTAKES ‘BALANCING’?
WTO rules are contained in around sixty agreements, annexes, decisions, and understandings, mostly negotiated and
concluded during the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round, which includes the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO,
and landmark multilateral agreements in trade in goods, trade
in services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, and government trade policy review.178 These agreements can be categorized according to: 1) “broad principles” (e.g. the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); 2) “extra agreements and
annexes dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or issues”; and 3) “detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists)
of commitments made by individual countries allowing specific
foreign products or service providers access to their markets”.179 Apart from the WTO agreements, other sources of
176

Id. at ¶ 13-44.
Andreas Blüthner, Trade and Human Rights at Work: Next Round,
Please?, in AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 355
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
178
See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Overview: A Navigational
Guide,
WTO
(last
visited
Jan.
1,
2014),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm.
179
Doha Declaration, supra note 179.
177
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WTO law (alternatively dubbed as soft law180) that may “clarify
or define the law applicable between WTO Members”181 include: the WTO dispute settlement reports, the acts of WTO
bodies, agreements concluded in the context of the WTO, customary international law, general principles of law, other international agreements, subsequent practice of WTO Members,
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, and the negotiating history.182 WTO Members accept the multilateral
agreements in the system as a “single undertaking…justified
as necessary to prevent the kind of free-riding that was possible in the disjoint legal order of the pre-Uruguay Round
GATT.”183 While it remains much debated if this approach indeed achieves complete uniformity of WTO rules, it is nevertheless acknowledged that the single undertaking approach significantly contributes towards increasing the consistency of the
content, scope, and application of these rules within the WTO
membership.184
Rule-making occurs from a combination of the processes of
negotiating treaties at the WTO pursuant to Article III:2 of the
WTO Agreement/185 Rule-making also occurs from the ‘second180

Mary Footer identifies soft law instruments in the WTO as “the resolutions adopted by the organisation’s institutional bodies. These include not
only ministerial declarations and decisions but also the decisions of the various councils and committees, which may embody understandings, guidelines,
notes produced by the WTO Secretariat at the request of the members,
Chairman’s statements and so on. While they are not intended to be legally
binding they may nevertheless have practical effect and may prove legally
relevant….[soft law in the WTO] has proven to be particularly useful where
there is broad lack of agreement or a lack of coordination among WTO members, where an issue is highly contestable or where cooperation gives rise to
distributive conflicts.” See Mary E. Footer, The (Re)turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO Law, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 241, 247-48
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789830.
181
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (Cambridge University Press
2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter VAN DEN BOSSCHE].
182
See PAUWELYN, supra note 164, at 40-52.
183
Nicholas Lamp, Democracy in the WTO – The Limits of the Legitimacy
Debate, in GLOBAL RISKS: CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD ORDER THROUGH LAW,
POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS (Janna Hertwig, Sylvia Maus & Peter Lang eds.,
2010).
184
See generally Craig VanGrasstek and Pierre Sauve, The Consistency of
WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geometry?, 9 J. INT. ECON. LAW 837 (2006).
185
Thomas Cottier, A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making, in
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ary legislation’, functional rules, and particularized decisions of
the WTO political organs issued to implement the covered multilateral agreements within the WTO system.186 The institutional structure of the WTO and its key political organs is laid
out in Article IV of the WTO Agreement: the Ministerial Conference (composed of all Member States meeting at least once
every two years); the General Council, which conducts the day
to day functions of the Ministerial Conference when the latter
is not in session, and also acts as the Trade Policy Review Body
(TPRB) and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); the three sectoral councils (Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in
Services, Council for TRIPS) which oversee the implementation
of the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS; other specialized councils,
committees, and groups as created by the Ministerial Conference (such as the Trade Negotiations committee, Committee on
Trade and Development, etc.).187 The WTO Secretariat discharges “exclusively international” responsibilities and administrative duties to implement instructions solely from the
WTO.188 These political organs of the WTO collectively discharge the WTO’s core functions under Article III of the WTO
Agreement:189 1) the facilitation of the implementation, administration, and operation of the WTO Agreement, the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements; 2) providing the forum
for negotiations of new agreements among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations; 3) administer the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); 4) administer the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM); and 5) coordinate
with other global economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and affiliated agencies.
Apart from these formal political organs, WTO rulemakers also appear in varied forms. WTO Member States conduct trade negotiations “in a context of flexible, interest-driven
REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 42, 49 (Debra P. Steger ed., Wilfrid Laurer University Press 2009),
available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/05075.pdf.
186
EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 59, at 51. See also Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a
Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 609, 625-44 (2001).
187
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, at art. IV.
188
Id. at art. VI.
189
See id. at art. III.
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coalitions. They may belong to more than one grouping, depending on their interests.”190 Depending on the negotiation
agenda for a given round,191 formal and informal coalitions
could be as durable or ephemeral as those for developing country Members, the least developed country (LDC) Members, the
European Union and its Member States, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Group of Latin America
and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group (ACP), the G-20, and the ‘Quad’ at the Uruguay Round (the four largest trading entities – the European
Communities, the United States, Japan, and Canada), as well
as those entities with Observer status, such as intergovernmental international organizations (the United Nations, the
World Bank, UNCTAD, among others).192 WTO decisions are
issued through negative consensus,193 with trade negotiations
and other key decisions often facilitated through the ‘green
room’ meetings between major WTO powers and select Members whose interests are most implicated in the particular
meeting.194 In any event, it should be clear that the legislative
process does not take place in isolation from the executive implementation of WTO rules, as “the WTO Agreement is not
meant to institutionalize any autonomous political process.”195
The WTO also provides for guidelines in its engagement
with non-governmental organizations, although this is largely
limited to transparency and public information concerns, since
the “Members have pointed to the special character of the
WTO, which is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty
of rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for
negotiations. As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for
190

Cottier, supra note 188, at 46.
See generally Robert Z. Lawrence, Rulemaking Amidst Growing Diversity: A Club-Of-Clubs Approach To WTO Reform and New Issue Selection,
2004 World Trade Forum, available at
http://hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/LawrenceClub%20ofClubsFinal.pdf
(proposing to delineate ‘clubs’ to which WTO members could additionally subscribe based on their interests and the core mission of the WTO).
192
VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 184, at 107-09.
193
See Jaime Tijmes-lhl, Consensus and majority voting in the WTO, 8
WORLD TRADE REVIEW 3 (July 2009).
194
Lawrence, supra note 194, at 144-49. .
195
Bogdandy, supra note 189, at 614.
191
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NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its
meetings.”196 In practice, however, NGOs have been able to
strategically engage the WTO throughout various areas of
trade policy-making and agenda-setting.197 Since the inception
of the WTO Guidelines, NGOs have been able to observe plenary sessions and ministerial conferences, obtain information on
trade issues, and strategically push their particular advocacies
on WTO member States, such as those on enforcing labor
rights, protecting the right to health and enabling access to essential medicines through compulsory licensing as an exception
to TRIPS obligations.198 To the extent that NGOs have been
able to incrementally influence the content of interpretations of
WTO norms thus far, they are still regarded as marginal players in WTO rulemaking.199
Despite the robust profusion of WTO rulemaking and
sources of rules, it is noteworthy in the design and nature of
rulemaking at the WTO that there are institutionalized opportunities for the centralized creation and interpretation of WTO
rules. The General Council – the highest political decisionmaking body of the WTO – also assumes other functions that
critically bear upon WTO rulemaking. When it acts as the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), it can review trade
196

General Council Decision, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations
with Non-Governmental Organizations, ¶ VI , WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm.
197
Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO
Debate and the Appropriate Role for Non-State Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71,
105 (2009) (“… NGOs already play an important role informally and have a
significant agenda-setting impact … [n]ow that NGOs are already actively
involved in trade negotiations, the more important question might no longer
be whether NGOs should participate, but what influence do NGOs have and
how is it being exercised.”); Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate
and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 683, 683-86 (2004); JL Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 433, 433-53 (1998); Steve Charnovitz,
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 340-47 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, NonGovernmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation,
Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 123-34 (1998).
198
See Shamima Ahmed, Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.817, 827-28
(2010-2011).
199
See Peter van den Bossche, NGO Involvement at the WTO: A Comparative Perspective, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 717, 717-49 (2008).
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policies and domestic regulations of the WTO Members for consistency with WTO rules.200 The General Council also wears an
adjudicative hat when it acts as the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) in adopting reports of dispute settlement panels and the
Appellate Body.201 The DSB does not only adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, but is also tasked to maintain surveillance of the implementation of rulings and recommendations,
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the WTO covered agreements, and to inform the relevant
WTO Councils and Committees of related developments arising
from disputes under the WTO covered agreements.202 As an
acknowledged “political institution”,203 the DSB has an enviable record on enforcing compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings.204 While the legislative process at the WTO primarily occurs through Member States’ trade negotiations, other
sources of rules (such as Ministerial Conference and/or the
General Council decisions, standards set by designated technical bodies or agencies in the WTO covered agreements) may
thus also involve rule-makers beyond the primary political organs of the WTO.205 The WTO system appears conducive to
harmonization largely because the common political institutions –the Ministerial Conference and the General Council –
retain authority to issue decisions on the authoritative interpretation of the WTO covered agreements. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is any focused, systematic,
or dedicated parliamentary oversight process over WTO rulemaking.206 The system does not encapsulate a perfect closed
200

Pieter Jan Kuijper, Some Institutional Issues Presently Before the
WTO, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 81, 81-83 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D.
Southwick eds., Cambridge University Press 2002).
201
See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 184, at 225 (regarding the multifunctional nature of the General Council).
202
DSU, supra note 34, at art. 2(1) - 2(2).
203
Benzing, supra note 140, at 279.
204
Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397403 (2007).
205
See Marion Jansen, Defining the Borders of the WTO Agenda, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 161, 167 (Amrita
Narlikar, Martin Daunton & Robert M. Stern eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
206
Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The
Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 629, 629-54
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version of legislation under classic separation of powers theory.207 Rather, the doctrine of delegation208 in the modern regulatory state should appear to be more applicable in assessing
how institutional, formal, and informal rule-makers at the
WTO deploy their authority, based on the consent of States to
the WTO covered agreements. The application of this doctrine
as a basis for assessing public authority at the WTO would,
perhaps, be appropriate when one considers the ‘constitutionalizing’ consequences of the WTO covered agreements on the ‘international legislative process’ on trade, and its concomitant
impacts on domestic law-making.209
While States author the treaty standards and norms governing global trade, in practice, the implementation of these
standards also trigger considerable rulemaking by other political institutions, such as, for trade law, the WTO General Council and Ministerial Conference, the sectoral Councils, the universe of standard-setting agencies and technical bodies
involved in the SPS, TBT, TRIPS, GATT, GATS, Agriculture,
and other WTO covered agreements.210 The same functional
(2004).
207

Under separation of powers “the legislative power includes the power,
through the enactment of laws, to specify the ends and means of public policy, but it does not include the executive power to administer and enforce
those laws or the judicial power to resolve cases arising under them.”
RICHARD E. LEVY, THE POWER TO LEGISLATE 138 (Greenwood Publishing 2006).
208
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 269 (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell 1973) (“The concept of ‘separation of powers’
designates a principle of political organization….there are not three but two
basic functions of the State: creation and application (execution) of law, and
these functions are not coordinated but sub- and supra-ordinated.”).
209
See GAIL ELIZABETH EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
193-243 (Kluwer Law International 2000); see also JOHN H. BARTON ET AL.,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
GATT AND THE WTO 61-90 (Princeton Univ. Press 2010); John H. Jackson,
The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4
J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 67-78 (2001).
210
One scholar refers to a generalized model of “multilevel regulatory
governance”, where “the capacity of each level to carry out the regulatory
function must be verified. It must be based on the comparative advantage of
each level. There needs to be coordination between different levels of government before the transfer of power. This would lead to an ongoing process
of a dynamic separation of powers. The key element in the new situation is
coherence. In the absence of coherence there is a risk of contradictory rules,
excessive regulation or regulatory gaps….” Brigid Gavin, Reconciling Re-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3

60

3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/14/2015 4:41 PM

BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

609

reasons for delegation – the need for agency expertise; the lack
of time and resources for States to directly undertake, monitor,
and coordinate rulemaking; as well as the value of removing
implementation decisions from more political forums –211 may
also be applied to explain the proliferation of rule-makers and
rule-making beyond States’ formulation of treaty standards in
the world trade system. To the extent that non-delegation doctrine also makes itself amenable to critiques of public participation in the regulatory process,212 and also is subject to some
form of judicial review,213 one can also test the legitimacy of
trade rulemaking. In any event, the fundamental public policy
institutional deficits at the WTO demonstrably arise from a
lack of institutional coordination across the three functional
pillars on how to approach WTO Members’ trade and non-trade
public policy objectives. Members have the foremost voice at
the WTO but not all Members are heard equally in the real corridors of power and decision-making at the WTO.214 Balancing
trade and non-trade public policy objectives require complex informational interfaces from the widest possible sources – governmental, non-governmental, international, and local – and
yet there is no well-established and cohesive method yet established by the WTO Secretariat to systemically consult all
stakeholders that may be concerned with respect to different
environmental, social, labor, cultural, and developmental public policies.215 Institutional coordination of Members’ trade and
non-trade public policy objectives cannot be achieved without
establishing the necessary information architecture to elicit
relevant information from the WTO Membership, international
gionalism and Multilateralism: Towards Multilevel Trade Governance, in
MULTILATERALISM, REGIONALISM, AND BILATERALISM IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
59, 64-65 (Philippe De Lombaerde ed., Springer 2007).
211
KELSEN, supra note 211, at 673.
212
Id. at 680.
213
Id. at 682.
214
See JOHN WARREN HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR 251
(Brill, 2008); Yong-Shik Lee, World Trade Organization and Developing
Countries: Reform Proposal, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 105, 108-11 (Yong-Shik Lee, Gary Horlick, WonMog Choi, & Tomer Broude eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
215
See CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS IN
WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 471-72 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2011).
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specialized agencies at the United Nations, non-governmental
organizations, citizens, groups and other constituencies that
are ordinarily consulted in a public policy and regulatory management process.216
CONCLUSION: ACTUALIZING THE ‘PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION
AND COORDINATION’ - THE WTO AS THE FORUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY
India’s failure to ratify the Protocol to the TFA signals the
most significant tipping point in the stalled Doha Round on the
tensions on Members’ expectations of flexibility from WTO
commitments for non-trade public policy commitments. Lack of
institutional coordination on the ongoing dialogue and decisionmaking in the standard-setting, trade policy review, and dispute settlement functional pillars of the WTO comes at the
price of abrupt ‘defections’ from WTO compliance by those who
perceive that the WTO is an inappropriate (if not paralyzed) forum for balancing trade and non-trade public policy objectives.
As a World Bank publication presciently observed:
“Perceptions of inequities in the WTO decision-making system
implicitly call into question other facets of governance, specifically, the failure to balance the costs and benefits arising from trade
negotiations. The end result has been an absence of ‘ownership’ of
many agreements, and a general suspicion of the WTO…To be
sure, the WTO is not an international organization intended to
‘govern’ the global economy, or even international trade relations,
as a whole. It does, however, perform some functions of governance at the international level by providing a forum for trade
rule-making (legislative function); protecting trade opportunities;
fostering transparency in the trading system; and enforcing rules
through a dispute settlement system (judicial function). In addition, there are other functions not attributed formally to the
WTO that are subject to an intense international debate as to
whether they should be put under its purview. Examples include
the supply of international public goods and the subjection of
216

See CITIZENS AS PARTNERS: OECD HANDBOOK ON INFORMATION,
CONSULTATION, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING 27-39 (OECD
2001); Elizabeth Smythe, Democracy, development, and the WTO’s legitimacy
challenge: Assessing the Doha Development Round, in THE WTO AFTER HONG
KONG: PROGRESS IN, AND PROSPECTS FOR, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND
(Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson eds., Routledge 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3

62

3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/14/2015 4:41 PM

BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

611

markets to social objectives. Given the scope of the recent questioning on WTO governance, efforts to pursue new trade negotiations on a comprehensive basis will probably have to go hand in
hand with a streamlining of the decision-making process that
pays due attention to the requirements of efficiency and legitimacy. Unless these worries are addressed, new negotiations will
add to the frustration.”217

The international law principle of cooperation218 – often
applied in circumstances involving States’ common interests in
managing shared resources and mitigating environmental risks
– is especially significant to the process of balancing trade and
non-trade public policies. Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement
imposes the duty upon WTO Members to bring their national
laws into conformity with WTO law, but, as seen in Parts II
and III, the substance of such WTO law insofar as trade and
non-trade policies is hardly made up of bright-line rules. If
WTO Members are expected to harmonize domestic regulatory
measures with WTO law as a matter of international obligation, then the balancing process for trade and non-trade public
policies must itself be transparently and consistently undertaken in all three of the WTO’s functional pillars – dispute settlement, trade policy review, and trade negotiations – to feasibly enable WTO Members to substantiate and internalize
conformity with WTO law in their respective public policy
management processes. In order to achieve optimal cooperation within the WTO system to arrive at the sustainable policy
flexibility originally envisaged in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement and the numerous public policy calibration
provisions in the WTO agreements, institutional coordination
premised on equal informational access and contribution by
Members and other public policy stakeholders will be critical.
Coordination and cooperation should be embraced as fundamental and foundational principles WTO law, stemming from
the teleological purpose and original design towards balancing
trade and non-trade public policy objectives that were built into
217

Diana Tussie & Miguel F. Lengyel, Developing Countries: Turning
Participation into Influence, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A
HANDBOOK (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo & Philip English eds., World
Bank 2002).
218
See Lake Lanoux Arb. (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Arb. Trib. 1957);
Nuclear Tests Cases (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
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the WTO agreements themselves through the public policy calibration provisions, and the assumption of legislative, executive, and judicial functions dispersed across WTO organs. The
crystal lesson from India’s refusal to ratify the Protocol to the
TFA and around fourteen years of stalled negotiations at the
Doha Development Round is that balance between trade and
non-trade public policy objectives – the development dimension
avowed in the WTO – is the ultimate object and purpose of the
WTO Agreements.219 The piecemeal, dispersed, and incremental approach to the balancing process thus far comes at a high
price for the entire WTO system, its participants, and the envisaged beneficiaries of global multilateral trade. As perceptions of illegitimacy remain unaddressed in the WTO, we risk
dooming the WTO to irrelevance.

219

See ASIF H. QURESHI, INTERPRETING WTO AGREEMENTS: PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES 114-159 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
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